Greetings Everyone!
In my scouting about for things to help me figure out if God loves everything else necessarily, voluntarily, neither or both, a question to which process and openness-of-God theologians tend to give somewhat different answers, I located an article by Delwin Brown that argues that God is so free that God could even "sin." I am drawn to much of what Brown wrote more than 30 years ago; however, I would like to hear the reactions of others before coming to a semi-final conclusion. To find his article from "Process Studies" on the Internet, please go to www.religion-online.org, then to "Process Studies Journal," the last entry under "Theology" and then to article # 58. Thank you!
Dave

Hi David, I tried the address you propose, but it didn't work. I saw that there must be a comma too much, but even without it I can't reach the destination. Is it still possible for you?
Bo

Hi Bo!
You are correct. Apparently because I placed a comma after it, the link to the above Religion Online Web Site does not work. I have success when I use this address: www.religion-online.org I look forward to your responses to Delwin Brown's article. Thank you!
Dave

David,

I read the article by Brown and didn't see anything new that hasn't already been discussed in these messages. If you've read Griffin's book, Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism, you'll see the Brown's ideas repeated.

The primary difference between the Open theologians and the Process Theologians, IMHO, is whether God is, by nature (that is, metaphysically), a social being or a "loner". Was there ever a time when God existed and no "other"? As you mentioned in another message, the trinity does not really provide a true society of individuals - just another one of those strange theological "mysteries". If God created the world "ex nihilo", then before creation God existed as the Absolute One. This christian view is no exception to the Perennial Philosophy and shares the same problems - how are the Many derived from the One? An Absolute One is without values, relations, changeability, creativity, possibilities, etc.. The trick for the Open theologians is to derive these things from the concept of the trinity. It CAN be derived from the idea of the trinity held by Process theologians: World, Creativity, God.

I kind'a think that the problem you are tackling has to do with the way the question is framed: Is God's love necessary or voluntary? The answer is not either-or, it is BOTH. Just as God's existence is contingent AND necessary, so also, God's love is contingent and necessary. As far as I know, only Process Theology is an exception to the Perennial Philosophy. God is not One or Many, God is both. "The Many become One and are increased by one". One way to put it, as I mentioned before, is THAT God loves is necessary - it follows from the idea that God is all-inclusive, but HOW God loves is voluntary, contingent, conditional, etc.. God exercises true unconditional love - but God is free, able to choose among possibilities, so that how God's love is revealed can change, depending upon conditions as they develop and become components of God's knowledge.

I would suggest reading Harteshorne's A Natural Theology For Our Time if you haven't read it yet.

Your 'umble layservant,
Don

I still have a problem with the site you mentioned, Dave, my web browser cannot open it...

In the meantime, I looked through Don's message, and it made me think (once more) of a tree-like form as a possible solution to at least some of the questions.

Imagine the multitude of the universe as corresponding to the tips of the branches of a very fast growing tree and let all the branches (i.e. necessarily) grow in such a way that only the tips of the branches ever meet (see, for example, the cosmic tree on my web site -- the www-button below). Their growth thus forms a universe of interacting tips(think of the universe as a circle or a globe) around the rest of the tree (this rest would then somehow correspond to the past of these tips, and, as a totality, to God). The tips in this universe would regard every displacement of a group of tips -- corresponding to a growth in a certain direction of this group -- as a contingent movement of a group of tips. A contingent movement as a result of a necessary growth, upheld by, and at the same time forming, one tree with many branches. The love of God would necessary flow through the branches, but how would depend on the way the branches grow together.

As my acquaintance with Whitehead is quite new, I am not sure if this kind of thinking is consistent with his philosophy. I suspect I have a different perspective -- and of course a rather awkward english.

It would be very interesting to have some reactions from anyone of you here.
Bo[/b]

Hi Don!

Thanks for taking the time to read Delwin Brown's article and to respond to me. I appreciate your help as I tree to see if there is a way to reconcile process and openness-of-God theology precisely where they differ most sharply.

Partly because John Cobb at Claremont was and continues to be one my favorite persons and teachers and Richard Rice is a respected colleague and good friend of mine at Loma Linda, just thirty miles east of Claremont, this is a matter of great personal interest to me!

I am not interested in officiating at a hasty or ill-conceived marriage of these two schools of thought. Nevertheless, particularly after reading Donna Bowman's excellent book "The Divine Decision," I think there is less difference between the two than I, and perhaps others, have thought, even though this is not her book's thesis.

Because Hartshorne strikes me as so much more clear and consistent than Whitehead on these matters, at this time I don't see much chance of complete concord on the basis of his thought. As you rightly say, once one defines God as the necessarily "All Inclusive One," process thought wins the game. Fair enough.

However, as David Ray Griffin demonstrates in "Reenchantment without Supernaturalism," a book I highly value even though I still do not understand how a human soul might be able subjectively to persist after the death of its body, Whitehead now and then said some things that seem to make God in some ways more volitional than the rest of his thought suggests, and certainly more so than Hartshorne's thought contends.

For excellent reasons, Griffin more or less sets these comments by Whitehead aside as "unfortuante slips." Remembering that Whitehead himself said that such "slips" in the writings of others have often proven to be doors to new and better possibilities, I am trying to see if his own "slips" can help reconcile process and openness-of-God theology precisely where they differ most clearly and deeply.

I agree with you that the most fundamental question is whether the basic situation is either "God-and-Universe," as process theology usually says, or just plain "God," as openness-of-God theology usually says. If forced to choose, I would say that a universe of some sort is "a gift from" God rather than "a given for God." Nevertheless, in my own heart of hearts, I believe that a universe of some sort is as everlasting as is God but that it is still ontologically dependent upon God. But what I personally believe is not the issue here!

The usual thing for process theologians is to say, as you rightly have, that God is necesssarily related to some universe and volitionally related to this particular one. In other words, as you say, THAT God loves others is necessary but HOW God loves others is contingent, or at least somewhat so. So far, so good. This truly narrows the distance between process and openness-of-God theologies. For this I am grateful!

However, at least some opennes of God theologians are still likely to be uncomfortable, theologically and existentially, with the idea that God necessarily loves any universe whatsoever. Does this mean that we have narrowed things are far as we honestly can? Maybe so, but then again, maybe not!

Donna Bowman points out that Karl Barth held that the doctrine of election pertains first of all to God's decision to be the One God actually is, particularly as revealed in Jesus Christ, and that this divine self-determination includes God everlasting decision to be with and for innumerable others. Meanwhile, John Cobb has written that the basic difference is that process theology grounds God's activity with and for others in God's nature whereas openness of God theology grounds these in God's will. But Barth's claim that God is both supremely contingent and supremely necessary at this time suggests to me that this distinction does not properly apply to God. If so, the reason for the most clear and basic difference between process and openness-of-God theology is an empty mirage. In other words, to use the earlier words of James Gustafson, this is still another "misplaced debate." Maybe it is even "much to do about nothing"!

This outcome strikes me as almost too good to be true! This is why I seek feedback from others to see if there is something I am overlooking.

By the way, if I understand it correctly, openness-of-God theolgy implies that at one time, sometime in the unimaginably distant past, pantheism was indeed the correct doctrine of God because at that time there was nothing, absolutely nothing whatsovever, but God. Ironically, then, Hartshorne's form of panentheism is a deeper protest against pantheism than is the openness-of-God alternative.

Thanks again, Don! Am I making any sense?

Dave

Hi Bo!

I am disappointed that you have not been able to get to www.religion-online.org. There is another alternative that might be worth trying, however. In the left hand column of the home page of this Web site there are several buttons for links leading to other pages. If one clicks on the one labeled "Links," one is taken to another page that features a list of hyperlinks to other relevant Web sites. If one clicks on "Religion Online," and if all goes well, one is taken directly to the appropriate Web site. I hope this works for you from Sweden!

I think you tree analogy fits the position of Hartshorne, at least as I understand it, very well. The tree sends tree sap (divine love) through its trunk and branches to its tips. Precisely what happens at the tips depends in part upon, or is contingent upon, how they have configured themselves. Many organisms probably have more self-determination than do tree tips; nevertheless, the analogy works, I think,

The trouble is that openness-of-God theologies are inclined to ask WHY the tree sends its tree sap (divine love) through its trunk and branches to its tips. If I understand them correctly, the usual answer of process theology is that the tree does this necessarily and the usual answer of openness-of-God theology is that the tree does this voluntarily.

Increasingly, I am of the mind that the distinction between necessity and contingency does not work very well when applied to this tree (God). Either way we go, problems seem to appear. Therefore, I agree with Don that the best answer is probably "both."

One thing I like about this answer is that it tends to erode the platform upon which process and openness-of-God theologies have been debating each other.

My thanks to you, Bo!

Dave

Yes, I have trouble with the idea of subjective existence after death also. I get the feeling that Griffin includes this idea in his theology in order to stay within acceptable boundaries of most Christian communities. It's almost a moot point for me as I don't have a problem with objective immortality - in fact, I think it has some moral advantages. The idea that we can find purpose and meaning for life in adding to the Whole without necessarily needing some kind of "heaven" or after-life reward seems to me to be a notch higher on the ethical scale.



Years ago I almost always answered questions with either a "yes" or "no". This is still my first gut reaction but I'm learning to look a little closer at possibilities and reply with "well, it all depends...". In this case the question "'God-and-Universe' or just plain 'God'" hinges on what is meant by "God" and "Universe". Can random chaotic events be considered a universe? Seems to me that without some kind of order there is no universe and without God there is no order. Therefore, only God is truly primordial. Also, "God-and-Universe" might imply that there is some kind of universe outside or having existence apart from God - which would certainly be problematic. I suspect that this is what the Open theologians really object to, perhaps not fully understanding the implications of panENtheism. I've never been introduced by someone who has said, "This is Don, and this is his body", as though I exist as "Don-and-body". And yet in certain contexts the distinction must be made. As to whether your personal beliefs are at issue... isn't theology all about finding reasons for what we find in our heart?




What is an "everlasting decision"? Aren't decisions events? A determination made from possibility? If, and I think they are, decisions and actualities are somewhat synonymous, an everlasting decision would be the same as an everlasting actuality. So, is God an everlasting actuality as Whitehead said, or is God a series of actualities/decisions?



YES! I don't know if an "Absolute One", strictly speaking, is pantheism but it is definitely Parmenides. At least Parmenides (and Hindus, etc.) understood that if there is an "Absolute One" the "Many" must be an illusion - change is not real. Although brought into Christianity by Greek influence, it was overlooked or not dealt with because this thought was included with the "revealed" package of truth and to question it was understood to be a lack of faith and thus a sin. Is it possible that many of those who object to Process Theology suffer from the primitive fear of offending an angry God (in their heart-of hearts)?

Don

Hi Don!

Thank you for your geneous and insightful responses. I find them most helpful!

Although it is my impression that David Ray Griffin actually believes what he writes about life after death, so far I have not been able to follow his train of thought on this topic. I still harbour hope for the resurrection of the body as an integative psychosomatic unity; however, like Paul in the New Testament, I suspect that my hope is hope, nothing more or less.

Meanwhile, like you, I find much value in the notion of objective immortality, both theoretically and practically. The thought that the positive contributions of my life, like those of all others, may enhance God's experience and the experience of those who succeed me is plenty enough for me even if it turns that this is all we get.

I conveyed the wrong idea when I wrote about God's "everlasting decision" to be with and for all others. You are correct that my wording leaves the impression that I side with those who favor the entitative view of God as a single unending occasion of experience. I don't. I find it more adequate to think of God as a personally ordered series of such occasions. I like Delwin Brown's analysis of God's freedom and faithfulness as seen in God's free decision in each occasion of divine experience to be faithful.

I think you are right that openness-of-God theology often sees more in the term "universe" than process theology intends when it says that the basic situation is "God-and-Universe." Perhaps both sides need to be careful here. On the one hand, the more process theology emphasizes the chaotic insignificance of the universe in the most basic situation, the more responsible it may seem to make God for the way things have actually gone in our own cosmic epoch. On the other hand, the more openness-of-God theology emphasizes the absolute singularity of God in the basic situation, the more it may seem to open the door to the kind of supernaturalism that Griffin rightly rejects. This is one of the places where your "well, it all depends...." approach strikes me as very helpful.

Your suggestion that perhaps some reject process theology because they are fearful of offending the angry deity reminds me that Whitehead's notion of "the deeper idolatry" is, of all things, one of the themes that most draws me to his thought. Hartshorne somewhere refers to the "monstrous" ways God is often depicted. How very true!

Thank you, Don!

Dave

Hi Dave!

I finally found the article by Delwin Brown, but not on its address, which is still not available. I made a search in Google, and after a few steps I found it cached in its enormous memory. To be able to make intelligent and comprehensible comments on it on it, there is, however, one element in my vision of the world that has to be clarified -- for myself and for others, I think. It is about the relation of the tree metaphor to the reality.

If you think of the branches as standing waves (sometimes growing together and sometimes repulsing each other) it is possible that the metaphor is closer to a concrete reality than most people think.

Trying to solve the problem of the relationship of the present to the past, I several years ago had the idea, that our experienced flux of time is a reflection of an ongoing transformation of the present into a real, persisting network of standing waves propagating by the emission (from the "tips" of the standing waves) of "propositional" waves into a chaos of waves ("quantum fluctuations") surrounding the expanding universe and corresponding to an unknown future. (The idea was more tentatively expressed at the time.)

Searching for literature that could help me with this idea I found Whitehead's "Science and the Modern World", and some of the sentences that impressed me most were these:



He was also looking for references to the past, so I thought he must have the idea that there is a "past" reality somewhere, serving as a reference to the present. My problem now is how to understand these references, that I find everywhere in his work and also elsewhere. For example I found this passage in the article by Delwin Brown:



Now, this existence of the past, as I understand it, is not considered as real by many followers of Whitehead. But then, as I understand it, you are back to the problem formulated by Whitehead in SMW.

The difficulty to consider a the past as a still existing reality can perhaps be explained by the fact that we (of course) cannot find it anywhere and also by one of the direct consequences of the idea of standing waves, namely that subjective existence after death would be possible.

I know, Dave and Don, that these are hard questions, but the idea of a "tree" of standing waves seems to solve so many hard problems (incl. David Chalmers' "hard problem" as I see it) so a discussion of them might be very fruitful.

"A clash of doctrines is not a disaster - it is an opportunity." (ANW)

Bo

Bo,

The word "real" is very ambiguous, isn't it? Only the past is actual. There is a "perishing" but it is not the occasion itself which perishes but the occasion as subject. All past occasions are objects - or food for becoming occasions.

Don

Yes, Don, I agree, the word "real" is ambiguous, at least it has an ambiguous pole that depends on what ontology you presuppose. The unambiguos pole is the direct reference to any subjective experience. Accepting, to begin with, an uncomplicated monistic world-view, the hard question is how subjective experiences relate to the rest of the world. If you just look at the brain from the outside, presupposing that what you (theoretically) can see is all that is relevant for the experience of that individual, a continuos experience is hard to explain.

A step towards a solution would be to admit the actuality of the past, so I agree on that. But I think the perishing of the subject might be an illusion caused by the dominance of the input of sense data. If it really is an illusion, i.e. if the subject doesn't perish but is preserved as a continuous (fourdimensional) network of standing waves (not directly visible, because we cannot travel backwards in time) it would be easier to explain the continuity of experiences -- and a lot of other phenomena pertaining to consciousness.

To think of higher dimensions is always difficult, if not impossible, but I think that this extension of the reality into four dimensions, with the vibrations of the network describable by the aid of a fifth dimension, is compatible with process thought.

I am glad, Don, that you gave me the opportunity to write down these, for this forum perhaps too theoretical, ideas of mine. Hope at least they can stimulate somebody here.

Bo

Bo,

I'm not sure we're making a connection here - perhaps you are referring to something way over my head but this is what I think we're discussing...

You wrote in an earlier message that some interpret Whitehead to claim that the past is not "real". Depending upon what one means by "real", this would be a misinterpretation based on his use of the term "perishing". The past does not perish - but there is a "perpetual perishing" as events begin as subjects, become objects, and end as "superjects". So, according to Whitehead there are no subjects HAVING experiences, rather there are experiential events. If there is no perishing of the event as subject, there would be no reality because there would be no "being", only "becoming". Or, another way to put it perhaps, is that if subjects don't become objects there would be nothing for a subject to experience.

There is an illusion but it is the illusion that I first referred to - that there is a "self" or a subject which does not perish as it moves from experience to experience.

Don

Yes, Don, you are right, I did misinterpret the word "perishing". Am I right if I take it to refer (at least partly) to the experience of the flow of time? This "subject-superject" relation is hard to grasp, but it seems to me as if it presupposes a relation that somehow transcends the space-time of physics, a kind of relation "inside" the experience binding the different stages together. This would be close to my own thinking.

Thanks to "idealdabbler" who posted a message on the "Process Thought and Natural Science" forum I found an article by Kirsty Kitto on http://www.scieng.flinders.edu.au/cpes/ ... ysics.html . On p. 2 I found this, which comes very close to how I imagine time:



The author continues to describe a complex mathematical model beyond my capacity of understanding (Cahills solution to account for process in physics).

I think, however, that I have an other solution to the problem of the missing present moment in physics. To continue with the same metaphor: Cut the ruler just at the point where the running finger is, and let it grow (!) together with the movement of the finger, which ideally should be a finger growing in the same direction as the ruler at the same speed. Now the ruler combines two concepts of time, the abstract, geometric time of physics (the part behind the growing end as seen from the outside by an imagined observer or registered by a physical apparatus), and the directly experienced process time (corresponding to the growing ruler as a sense experience or the growing finger as a directly felt experience).

This comes close to my last illustration on p. 4 of my folder http://home.swipnet.se/bo_herlin/pdf/time.pdf . The commentary beneath it is so concentrated that it might be hard to understand it, but I have a feeling that it is not very far from process thinking, even if its conclusion might go too far. The arrows of "free time" in the illustration can perhaps have some relevance to the problem of "necessity and freedom in Whitehead's God".

I'll continue to study the whiteheadian concepts, and I do appreciate your help.

Bo

Another non-standard aprroach to physics beside Cahill's Process Physics is Larson's Reciprocal System of Physical Theory
http://www.rstheory.com/wiki where both space and time are generated by processes rather than mere geometric containers or world-lines.