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February 4, 2003

New Resources for Process Thought I: Samuel Alexander's Emergentist Theism

Introduction:

- * great to be here
- * each seminar has its own ethos. I look forward to an open and exploratory discussion hour, so that I can see where your real concerns are.

- * I'm a process thinker who's a pluralist. I appreciate the many strands of process thought and am always looking for new ways to connect them, to reduce the tensions. My goal is to find new answers, new syntheses, with increased explanatory power.

- * This is the first in a series of lectures on *New Resources for Process Thought* which I plan to develop over the coming few years.

1. The idea of **Radically emergent theism**

We see emergence, novelty and creativity pervasively in the world around us, in ourselves, human culture, indeed, it appears, in reality itself. Since the emergence of novelty is so pervasive, what about the possibility of *understanding the deity as fully emergent as well?* Of course, there are currents in popular religion that do this: the divine grows and expands along with the expansion of the cosmos, life, and culture. Wolfhart Pannenberg, speaking at Harvard Divinity School in the sexy 60's, toyed with this idea: "Thus it is necessary to say that, in a restricted but important sense, God does not yet exist."¹ Or consider the more radical view of the Romantic philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, who argued in his famous *Freiheitsschrift*, the *Essay on Freedom*, that even the personhood of God was at one time merely potential and is only gradually becoming actual over the course of history.

What happens if you opt for the most uncompromising interpretation of emerging spirit that you can possibly conceive? Let's call it *radically emergent theism*. On this view there is no unchanging substance or thing that is God. Rather, "deity" is a quality that the always-changing *universe* comes to have increasingly over time. This emerging quality of deity feeds back onto the world, the way that mental phenomena beget other mental phenomena in the brain. In this framework you cannot say, "God exists," but you *can* speak of an increasing "deification" of the universe over time.

* This, in brief, is the radically emergentist theism that Samuel Alexander defended in his 1916-18 Gifford Lectures in Glasgow, and published in 1920 in a classic work, *Space, Time, and Deity*. As he writes [slide], "God is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity..."

(2:353).

* Alexander's theology endorses a God who is in the process of coming to be: at one time there was no God, and now — to put it strangely — there is only partly God. God is radically dependent on the world.²

* The fundamental metaphor is the mind/body relation [slide]: “Of such a being the whole world is the ‘body’ and deity is the ‘mind’” (par. 530; ref.”). This leads to panentheism. DEFINE. Thus he writes, “Now the body of God is the whole universe and there is no body outside him” (2:357).

* It's a very radical view. Alexander accepts, you might say, a verbal notion of God: the deity “deisms”; and these “deisings” or “enjoyments of the God” are things that the world does. The *world* is the subject of these actions; *it* does them; but what the world *does* is to deify itself. God is verb only — as in the famous book by Rabbi David Cooper, *God is a Verb: Kabbalah and the Practice of Mystical Judaism*.³ God does not create the world; the world “deises” itself.

* Alexander moves immediately to a revised notion of salvation [slide]: this “finite God,” he writes, “represent[s] or gather[s] up into its divine part its whole body” (ibid.). And then to a statement that is the inspiration for an ethics: “All we are the hunger and thirst, the heart-beats and sweat of God” (3:357)

2. The metaphysics of Samuel Alexander

1. Alexander's relation to Whitehead

1. With ref. to Whitehead's Method of Extensive Abstraction (def. of a point) [slide]: “Now nothing is further from my mind to minimize the importance or deny the legitimacy of this procedure; on the contrary, so far as I can follow these constructions, I admire them sincerely” (Pref. to 1927 reprint).
2. But Collingwood wrote in a letter in 1935 [slide], “There is still one point in which I think ... *P&R* fails to take up and develop a leading point in *S.T.D.*. Your work seems to me a world in which evolution and history have a real place: Whitehead's world is indeed all process, but I don't see that this process is in the same way productive or creative of new things (e.g., Life, Mind) arising on the old as on a foundation.... I don't believe that matter is really alive, and all that business. I think it's only a dodge to evade the question, how does anything generically new come into existence?” (I:xvii f.).
3. There's something right in what Collingwood writes. It's partly the motivation for this talk, and for my quest for “new resources” for process thought.
4. Alexander's own view: Whitehead was more of a Leibnizian (viz. pluralistic

- panpsychism); he himself was more Spinozistic (ibid.).
2. ***A Word on my method:*** The goal is not refutation but comprehension. There are so many resources for process thought; we need to mine them all. Not uncritically: let the adventure of ideas be tempered by critical thinking. Still, the cardinal sin of metaphysics is exclusion; it must be the most inclusive of disciplines. (In this statement is contained the heart of my ethis, and I think of Christian ethics — repeat it.) One best includes another (person, position) by understanding the heart of his or her position. So let's do that with Alexander.
 3. Every metaphysician, it seems, starts with a pressing problem and a central idea; the brilliant ones extend it fruitfully across a broad range of experience.
 1. Alexander's pressing problem is the mind-body problem. He begins with both as givens; if we're to follow him, we must also. (This can be hard for Whiteheadians!). There are really bodies in the universe, and there are really mental properties or mental experience. (Take these as givens.) The prob. then is to relate them.
 2. There are 4 classic responses to the mind-body problem: dualism; the mental is primary; the physical is primary (hence no mind); and mind emerges from physical. Alexander = emergence. W/in emergence there is weak and strong emergence, depending on how strong is the role of the active subject or mental pole. Alexander advocates only "weak" emergence.
 3. The inspiration is Spinoza. For any given level of reality there is only one (type of) activity. Thus in the mind-body prob. only one activity, one causal system -- not mental causes and physical causes [slide]. "It seems at first blush paradoxical to hold that our minds enjoy their own causality in following an external causal sequence, and still more that in it influencing the course of our thinking we contemplate causal sequence in the objects" (2:152). Thus minds "contemplate" and "enjoy." They don't *cause*!
 4. In the end Alexander pushes more toward the physical pole. The real causality seems to come from the events in the external world. It's just that some causal strings are actual, and others are only imagined: "Plato in my dreams tells me his message as he would in reality" (2:154). E.g., suppose you think of the city Dresden and of a painting by Raphael located there [slide]. "When thinking of Dresden makes me think of Raphael, so that I feel my own causality, Dresden is not indeed contemplated as the cause of Raphael, but Dresden and Raphael are contemplated as connected by some causal relation *in the situation which is then my perspective of things*" (2:154).
 5. Clearly this works with sensations. Alexander then applies it as a universal theory of mind:
 1. our motor sensors sense movement of objects in the world, viz. our limbs. Our

eyes detect movement external to us in the world.

2. [slide] “My object in the sensation of hunger or thirst is the living process or movement of depletion, such as I observe outside me in purely physiological form in the parched and thirsting condition of the leaves of a plant.” It’s a mistake to think that “the unpleasantness of hunger is ... psychical, and so hunger tends to be treated as a state of mind” (2:171). *Here Alexander sounds like a physicalist. Some interpret him as a non-reductive physicalist in the current philos. of mind debate.*
3. [slide] “It is no wonder then that we should suppose such a condition to be something mental which is as it were presented to a mind which looks on at it; and that we should go on to apply the same notion to colors and tastes and sounds and regard these as mental in character” (ibid).
4. In extending these ideas, Alexander uses “mind” as a metaphysical category and not just to mean consciousness. In general, then, the “body” aspect of anything = the constituent factors into which it can be analyzed. “Mind” aspect = the new quality which they manifest when functioning as a whole (from Emmet, xv). Mind is, as Whitehead writes, “the spearhead of novelty.”
5. **Extended to all nature: the theory of emergence.** [I think he’s right here!]
 1. **define emergence [slide]:** “Within the all-embracing stuff of Space-Time, the universe exhibits an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existence, each with its characteristic empirical quality. The highest of these empirical qualities known to us is mind or consciousness. Deity is the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know” (2:345).
 2. **emergence** = the appearance of something more. Anti-reduction. Increasing complexity leads to newness. Quantitative increase can lead to qualitative change. Laws of when it does. Kaufmann’s new “general biology.” Levels of reality. Genuinely new *types* of things. Leads to hierarchy in nature. Not of value but of kinds of things. Higher remain dependent on the lower, and on natural laws; physics still constrains. In sum, the appearance of the genuinely new. A powerful movement in contemp. philos. of sci. and now theology.
 3. So here’s an outline of Alexander’s ladder of emergence in 8 steps (with some help from Dorothy Emmet):
 1. at base of whole thing is Space-Time. Time is “mind” and space is “body.” Time is “the mind of space.” (I don’t accept this part.) Space-time is composed of “point-instants.” Some parallels with Whitehead.
 2. Space-Time is differentiated by “motions.” Certain organized patterns of motions (today we’d say energies) are bearers of the qualities we can material. So, *contra* Aristotle, matter itself is emergent. (Cf. quantum field theory, the generalization of quantum theory, which is the foundation of macrophysics. Bernard

d'Espagnat's *Veiled Reality* describes it well: atomic particles are products of the field, derivatives of it.

3. organizations of matter are bearers of macrophysical qualities and chemical properties. = the molecular level.
 4. at a certain level of complexity, molecules are the bearers of life. (Today we are beginning to understand the initial evolution of life. Gradual transition using complex molecules.)
 5. add to Alexander: evolution of sentience, simple volition (choice of where to move), symbiosis (reciprocal systems), sociality, thought
 6. some living structures are bearers of the quality of mind or consciousness, "the highest empirical quality known to us."
 7. at a certain level mind may be productive of a new emergent quality, Deity
 8. something drives the whole process: [slide] "There is a nisis in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence" (2:346).
3. Alexander's Radically Emergent Doctrine of God
1. Note: I at least feel the tug in this direction. Agree with the problems he recognizes and the skepticism he voices. But in the end I find myself dissatisfied. I hope we can talk later abt. its strengths and weaknesses.
 2. Religion is torn b. two poles: the affective side (religious sentiment) cannot show that the whole is anything more than "religious fancy" or projection. The metaphysical side can do this, but it may not be the object of religious passion. Alexander's theory attempts to find a position between these two. It's not just "the feeling of abs. dependence," nor just a theory about a metaphysical being.
 3. skepticism: we can't really know [slide]: "That the universe is pregnant with such a quality we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars still are raised to the unknown God. if we could know what deity is, how it feels to be divine, we should first have to have become as gods. What we know of it is but its relation to the other empirical qualities which precede it in time. Its nature we cannot penetrate" (2:247).
 4. Perhaps we can know little of the divine essence, God-as-infinite. But we can know about *the attribute of deity*, at least by extension, since it's part of the ladder of emergence.
 1. 3 possible answers (each attractive): (1) deity is the next level after mind or spirit. (2) Deity is the ult. level. And: (3) for any level, the next level (for it) is deity.
 2. note: deity is to minds as our mind is to (the parts of) our bodies. Follows that God's "body" = the minds in the universe. [slide] "One part of the god's mind will be of such complexity and refinement as mind, as to be fitted to carry the new quality of deity.... As our mind represents and gathers up into itself its whole body, so does the

- finite god represent or gather up into its divine part its whole body” [viz., minds].... For such a being its specially differentiated mind takes the place of the brain or central nervous system with us” (2:355).
3. Another Whitehead parallel: our minds are infinite in one respect: “Our minds are infinite in so far as from our point of view, our place or date, we mirror the whole universe; we are compresent with everything in that universe.... Though only a limited range of distinct things comes within our view, they are fringed with their relations to what is beyond them, and are but islands rising out of an infinite circumambient ocean” (2:358). God’s mind is infinite in all respects, becoz responds to the world *from all points of view*, all places in space-time.
 5. God can’t be infinite or finite. (1) If God were infinite, he [sic] couldn’t be actual. Coz as soon as he became actual, there would be many gods. Think of mind: at one point it didn’t exist in the universe. As soon as it did, it existed *as many minds*. God wd. exist *as many deities*. (2) If God existed as many, they would limit each other, and thus be finite.
 1. Could all the minds be linked together God can’t exist as a society of minds? No evidence that the minds of distinct bodies “are actually connected together so as to constitute a single all-embracing mind” (2:351).
 2. nor is God the mind of the crowd or collective (or family), since such groups don’t have a single mind.
 6. There is profound understanding of the modern prob. of God in metaphysics here. //s question, Can God be a person?
 7. Alexander’s Answer: I don’t know whether finite gods exist. Perhaps there are thousands already walking the earth. (= spiritual teachers?? Christ, Buddha?) But the infinite God cannot exist. Yet. Only the universe could have these qualities. [2 slides] “The infinite God is purely ideal or conceptual [at present].... As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity but is the universe as tending to that quality. This nisus in the universe, though not present to sense, is yet present to reflection upon experience. Only in this sense of straining towards deity can there be an infinite actual God” (2:361). [cont’d] “Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nisus toward deity; and this is the God of the religious consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts the divinity of its object as actually realised in an individual form” (361f.) “The actual reality which has deity is the world of empiricals filling up all Space-Time and tending towards a higher quality. Deity is a nisus and not an accomplishment” (364).
 8. Comment: in some ways a beautiful vision. Highly compatible with the empirical method and the results of science. Yet preserves the sense of emergent purpose or order - - emergent deity. As a present quality of a present universe, but not as a present infinite being. The work concludes with a chap. on “deity and the religious sentiment” and one on “deity and value.” (Don’t have time to sum. them.)
 1. He clearly makes the transition from sci-based knowl. of the world to values and the

- core experiences of rel. Does so with minimal metaphysical baggage. Keeps much of what has motivated theism. Has to revise theism. You must decide whether he's gone too far.
4. **My Critique** of Sam Alexander. Some aspects of radically emergent theism very attractive; others should give us pause:
 1. There is much here worth preserving. (I particularly like the concept: "All we are the hunger and thirst, the heart-beats of God.")
 2. good on part-whole, and on One-Many. Actually, in some ways better than *Process & Reality*. Each level of the hierarchy constitutes a whole for its parts -- not in a derivative fashion like the doct. of societies. Reminds me of Bracken's use of the "field" concept.
 3. **Improving this response to the mind-body problem** [optional]
 1. [[Methodological note: I proceed by rational reconstruction. He said as much as he could given the neuroscience of his day. E.g. the hypo. that "consciousness is situated at the synapsis of juncture between neurones" (2:129). I offer you what, given his writings, he would have said if he had access to the best science of our day.]
 2. Mental response is not separable into parts but is a whole (2:129). Roger Sperry: mind is the brain taken as a whole. Modify: a mental event is the whole composed out of individual neural events and states, *and* something more.
 4. Time as the "mind of space." This presupposes that time, by itself, is directional or purposive. But here Alexander illegitimately imports a concept from a later level of emergence.
 1. Alexander makes this explicit with his notion of *nisus*. Nisus stands for the creative tendency in Space-Time [slide]. "There is a nisus in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence" (2:346).
 2. Time as "the advance into novelty." But this presupposes, first, "time's arrow." It also presu's history, or creative advance. By itself, time is only measured succession. "Time's arrow" is not given by the infinite whole of time divided into point-instants. ***He needs to build in time from the outset.***
 1. Whitehead's panexperientialism is one way to do this. Classical theism is another. We return to this point.
 5. ADD: the need for a subject [predictable failure given the reliance on Spinoza.].
 1. Alexander's position (weak emergence) reconciles better with contemp. scientific methodology and conclusions better than almost any position, save physicalism. He doesn't posit new emergent substances or agents, only levels of reality.
 2. But it's not enuf. [[EXPLAIN WHY SPINOZA'S theory of mind not adequate.]] You need agents.
 3. Whitehead'ian process tho't gives an agent-force in the actual occasion. But pays the

- cost of postulating agents where we have no evidence for them. Alexander avoids that postulation. But then has trouble explaining the emergence of actual agents. *Mind as an attribute is not the same as mind as an agent.*
4. I advocate the emergence of agents/agency. But then *I* face the probl. of how real agents could actual emerge in the course of history.
 - 5.

6. You cannot be too squeamish if you are a radical theist of this sort. Pierre Bayle, the late 17th-century author of the *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, attacked the radical theism of Spinoza (if theism is still the right word!), by ridiculing a God so tightly bound to world as to be indistinguishable from it [slide]:

For one good thought the infinite Being will have a thousand foolish, extravagant, filthy, and abominable. It will produce in itself all the follies, idle fancies, lewd and unjust practices of mankind...; it will be united to them by the most intimate union that can be conceived.” (Pierre Bayle, “Spinoza,” *Dictionnaire historique et critique de Pierre Bayle*). [add comment]

7. A Big Problem: the divinization of humanity, and the finitization of God. For it is perhaps an all-*too*-noble place to which Alexander’s emergentism assigns us humans: “We are infinite because we are in relation to all Space-Time and to all things in it. Our minds are infinite in so far as from our point of view, our place or date, we mirror the whole universe; we are compresent with everything in that universe” (369b).

Now this deification or divinization of humankind may have been attractive to Feuerbach, to Victorian England, or to German thinkers early in the 20th century, infused as they were with the fiery certainty of cultural superiority. But the 20th was, I suggest, a bad century for the so-called infinite goodness of Man. The Holocaust, and the small-h holocausts that preceded and followed it, squelched melioristic humanism more effectively than anyone could have imagined at century’s outset. Who can forget that, a little more than a year ago, we dragged ourselves trembling into the fall semester, the dust from the World Trade Center still falling on our desks and our clothing and our souls? [[Who can forget that we (most of us) are citizens in a democracy “under God” that is waging war as we speak on Muslim nations “under God,” that is calling for expanded aggression against Muslim countries, and that is supporting the war of a Jewish state against its Palestinian territories? The only thing “divine” I recognize in these actions is the invocation of the name of God in defense of the actions of all sides.]] We should no more rejoice in the crumbling of the so-called “infinite potential of humanity” than in the collapse of the ideals of Communism; but honestly compels theology to proclaim the demise of both (at least in the forms heretofore advanced).

For, it turns out, humanity’s deification and God’s finitization are related; to assert one *just is* to assert the other. Radically emergent theism, accepting one, accepts both. Samuel Alexander, by going *too* far, reveals the limits of radically emergent theism [slide]:

As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity but *is the universe as tending to that quality*. ... Only in this sense of straining towards deity can there be an infinite actual God. ... Thus there is no actual finite being with the quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nusus to deity; and this is the God of the religious consciousness ... God as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo (370-1, italics added).

- Indeed, it's not hard to locate Alexander's specific error. He accepts the principle, "Deity is subject to the same law as other empirical qualities, and is but the next member of the series" (371a). But this principle is mistaken, is it not? Radical emergence must allow for the otherness of what emerges, since (as we saw) emergent realities are different from what came before.

* With this break from Alexander, we also reach a certain limit of "the world and God in convergence." Something there is of God that remains other to the world and humanity. (This critique applies also the the parallelisms in the end of *P&R*, tho I won't flesh out all the connections here.)

- Thus the ladder of emergence may lead *up to* the notion of deity, without providing a full understanding of them.⁴ At some point in the hierarchy of emergence we encounter entities that no longer obey the logic of emergence — ideas like *ground*, or *radical transcendence*, or *the completion of all things (eschaton)*.

Concluding Section: Toward an Emergentist Theology of Spirit

Today there is time only for three concluding points:

(1) *Nature's propensity for developing more complex forms does not justify concluding that nature exists for the purpose of bringing about intelligent animals such as ourselves.* As the Oxford theologian Keith Ward writes, "There have been so many blind alleys in evolution, some many genetic mutations which have not proved conducive to survival, and so many dispositions built up over millennia which are now counterproductive to the sustenance of life, that it is unconvincing to take nature, as William Paley did, as the perfect contrivance of a God who designs every detail for the best."⁵ Instead, it is in the compatibility of the two stories — the theistic story of creation and the Darwinian story of natural selection — that we find the path for a theology of evolution. Again Keith Ward [silent slide]:

The process by which the flickering and transient energies within the atom give rise to stable atomic compounds, then to self-replicating molecules of immense and organized complexity, to the formation of central nervous systems which enable organisms to react consciously to their environment, and finally, on this planet at least, the emergence of the neo-cortex, making possible abstract understanding and responsible freedom, *is readily interpretable as directed towards the genesis of intelligent agency* (pp. 20-21, italics mine).

“Interpretable as” is a *very* open-ended claim. It is the prolegomenon to a theology of nature, emphatically not, however, to a natural theology of the sort one finds in the Intelligent Design movement.

(2) *An emergentist theology, like Whiteheadian thought, looks for the divine not in the exceptions to nature, but in its patterns.* For Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* [silent slide], “the highest degree in miracles” involved “those works wherein something is done by God that nature can never do. For instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still, that the sea be divided and make way to passers by. ... The greater the work done by God, and the further it is removed from the capability of nature, the greater the miracle.”⁶ In a similar vein, C. S. Lewis describes his view of reason’s (and, later, God’s) relation to the world [silent slide]: “Nature (at any rate the surface of our own planet) is perforated or pock-marked all over by little orifices at each of which something of a different kind from herself — namely reason — can do things to her.”⁷ Likewise, “if God annihilates or creates or deflects a unit of Matter He has created a new situation Immediately all Nature domiciles this new situation, makes it at home in her realm, adapts all other events to it” (ibid., p. 94).

By contrast, emergentists (and most other process thinkers) look to the *patterns* in nature when they speak of divine action. As Wolfhart Pannenberg argues in his systematics [slide slide], “God has bound his creative action to the laws of nature, which are grounded in [God’s] creative action, but this no more excludes the creation of what is new than does the immediacy of each created form to God.” For “the mediation of all emerging and perishing by the validity of the laws of nature is a condition if creaturely forms are to achieve the independence vis-à-vis God that lies in the concept of a creature distinct from its Creator.”⁸

Admittedly, there are costs and gains from this new theological focus. It removes the burden of making every act of God a contradiction of natural law. But the cost is that one cannot compel others to accept the dimension of Spirit: as long as divine influence is fully consistent with what natural law predicts, then one *could* explain each event without the divine component. The theologian becomes continually vulnerable to the famous retort by Laplace, “I have no need of that hypothesis.”⁹

(3) Emergentist panentheism complexifies traditional ascriptions of purpose, personhood, conscious agency and action to God. *But it does allow for the identification of active agency in the world with the divine.* It gives a new home to the language of the Psalmist, “When thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their dust. When thou sendest forth thy breath, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the ground” (Ps. 104: 29-30). To identify emergent activity with Spirit encourages a religious interpretation of the ladder of complexity (and, I think, a powerful environmental ethic). As the German theologian Jürgen Moltmann writes [silent slide],

This means that the Spirit is the efficacious power of the Creator and the power that quickens created beings. It also means that this power is itself creative, not created, and that it has been ‘breathed forth’ by the Creator, that is to say, emanated. And this, in its turn, means that in the Spirit the Creator himself is present in his creation. Through the presence of his own being, God preserves his creation against the annihilating

Nothingness.¹⁰¹¹

Closing with Metaphors

The panentheistic theologian Sallie McFague writes, “The world is the bodily presence, a sacrament of the invisible God.”¹² Here the connotations of embodiment theologies become fruitful for Christian life and practice (and I hope for other traditions as well): for understanding sacraments (in which the divine becomes “visible and palpably present”); for expressing the suffering of God; for comprehending the risks and the costs implied by the doctrine of divine love; and for encouraging an environmentally conscious Christian lifestyle, what theologians are now calling the “greening of theology.”¹³

* This is emergence. If the right metaphysics can be found, it’s a powerful resource for process thought. Marjorie Suchocki has beautifully described the God-world relationship that can result [FINAL SLIDE]: “the occasion [note that she means *all* actual occasions, not just humans] can become itself and more than itself in God. The occasion is linked into the concrescence of God, even while remaining itself. Thus the peculiarity obtains that the occasion is *both* itself *and* God: it is apotheosized. As a participant in the divine concrescence, it will feel its own immediacy, and God's feeling of its immediacy as well.”¹⁴ Thank you.

Endnotes

1. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Theology and the Kingdom of God* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), p. 56.

2. “A substance or piece of Space-Time which is mental is differentiated in a portion of its mental body so as to be divine, and this deity is sustained by all the Space-Time to which it belongs” (Alexander, 367).

3. Rabbi David Cooper, *God is a Verb: Kabbalah and the Practice of Mystical Judaism* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1997).

4. We are more comfortable today speaking of it as spirituality. Something there is in humanity that represents the spiritual dimension. A full discussion of spirituality requires a phenomenology of lived spirituality and a comparative theological study of spiritualities.

5. Keith Ward, “Nature, Red in Tooth and Claw,” *Research News and Opportunities in Science and Theology*, vol. 2 #7 (March 2002): p. 21.

6. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, chap. 101, “On Miracles,” in Anton C. Pegis, *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1945), 2:199.

7. C. S. Lewis, *Miracles* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1947, 2001), p. 40.
8. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 2:72f.
9. Cf. Barth on theodicy in *Church Dogmatics* III/1, 388ff.
10. Jürgen Moltmann, *God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God*, The Gifford Lectures 1984-85 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 98.
11. Moltmann, *God in Creation*, p. 100.
12. See Sallie McFague, “The World as God’s Body,” *The Christian Century* (July 20-27, 1998): 671-72; see also her *The Body of God: An Ecological Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). The following quote is from the same source.
13. See Steven Bouma-Prediger, *The Greening of Theology: The Ecological Models of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995).
14. See the treatment of “The Panentheistic Analogy” in Clayton, *God and Contemporary Science* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press and Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), esp. chap. 8.