

Volume 7 (1977)
Whitehead's insights on death ("perpetual perishing" and "objective immortality.") were intuitive. The authors attempt to find a way of justifying some of these intuitions by Whitehead's own principles.
Whitehead: "In the name of Liberty, we demand the Suffrage for Women."
Dr. Fancher refutes Rem Edward’s polemic against Whitehead’s theory of the self as a society (see "The Human Self: An Actual Entity or a Society?" ) Fancher asserts Edward is wrong because God is not exempt from the epochal theory of time, and also, Edward’s "gap theory" criticisms rest on Newtonian time and the fallacy of simple location.
Does Whitehead’s metaphysics provide adequate support for his claim of "substance within substance?" To what extent is Whitehead in opposition to Aristotle on this subject? The author believes Whitehead provides adequate support of his assertions concerning this immanence.
Whitehead uses the term ‘subjectivist principle’ in two ways: one refers to a principle which he rejects (affirming that the datum includes actual entities, not just eternal objects), while the second refers to a more general principle which he accepts (the datum of experience involves only universals and hence no actualities).
Dr. Capek explains the distinction between immediate memory of earlier portions of the specious present and memory of the present. The totality of the past is present, not as a homogeneous bloc, but in the form of qualitative continuum of different degrees of vividness.
Whitehead outlines twenty-seven items in his Categories of the Ultimate. Dr. Graham declares the ultimacy of three of these: The ‘one’ (the ontological principle), the ‘many’ (the principle of relativity), and ‘creativity’ (the principle of process).
Is LSD a drug inducing psychotic alterations of behavior and personality similar to insanity, or is it an instrument of enlightenment that creates an understanding of the mystical experiences it produces?
The author reconstructs and explains the necessary conditions of individual free acts treated by Henri Bergson. Bergson's initial acceptance of the fact of freedom finally includes the entirety of physical and psychic reality as its precondition.
Physicists now say what Whitehead said rather long ago: that nature consists, in the last analysis, of "events, not things." Physicists as such can hardly be expected to see also that causal inheritance is prehensive.
Hartshorne makes the possible-actual distinction by insisting that the possible lacks the definiteness of the actual; possibility is essentially indefinite and determinable. Hence, actualization is the becoming (or incoming) of new definiteness. But Peters makes a clear distinction between facts and events, a distinction between definiteness (definite truth) and concrete entities themselves.
Whitehead specifically directs his readers to Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and Hume for early glimpses of his own philosophy, especially in connection with the ontological principle. The author analyzes Locke’s concept of power by examining the contexts in which that term is used in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, thus shedding light on problems common to both Whitehead and Locke.
The author deals with Whitehead’s proposed theory of reality that provides a natural ontological basis for quantum theory. The basic elements of his theory are events that actualize, or bring into existence, certain definite relationships from among a realm of possibilities or potentialities inhering in the set of prior events.
Space is symmetrical in its mathematical, abstract form: -- isotropic, static, one-modal. But concrete process finds space entangled with acting entities and with time, and in this concrete domain, the symmetries of abstract fields do not exactly match the facts of location.
Whitehead’s notion of immanence needs to be more fully explicated if it is to be applied to social and moral questions. This can be accomplished if it is brought into dialogue with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of sedimentation.
An analysis of a concept in process thought dealing with one aspect of quantum mechanics which theorizes that the earlier of two events cannot affect the other if the distance between them is so great that a light signal cannot traverse it during the time interval separating the two events.
The author does not believe that Whitehead’s "creativity" best serves as the concept of ultimate or final generality.
The author is concerned with the role Charles Peirce’s categories play in the development of Hartshorne’s principles of internal and external relations. Together with the influence of Whitehead, Peirce’s categories helped shape Hartshorne’s philosophy of subjectivism.
The author traces some affinities within neo-Confucianism that point in the direction of many themes of process philosophy, namely the relations of mind, action, and value.