Abstract
The general ontic structure of the fully concrete res verae is
the structure of an occurring event (actual occasion). Both in its aspect
of occurring duration, as well as in the aspect of its characteristic
pattern, it is bound to the general condition of extension. Its occurring
extendingness leads to and results in the extendedness of its
characteristic pattern.
This characteristic pattern is only finally
determinate in the satisfaction of the occasion. It is of the nature of a
(complex) object. That is to say that it can be recognized. This means
that it is an orderly appearance. It relates the occasion to the order of
the universe and determines its species. During the occurrence of the
occasion, it functions as regulative final end (subjective aim).
Thus it plays a role both in anticipation as well as
in retrospect. Being an object, it is atomic, and as such it is
responsible for the atomic aspect of reality. This atomicity, however, in
no way derogates from the continuity which is implied in the extensiveness
of all becoming and transition. Only by combining the theory of events
with the theory of objects can the puzzles in the relation between
continuity and atomicity be solved.
Content
1. Introduction
2. Presuppositions and methodological preliminaries
PART ONE. PROLEGOMENA
3. Perception
4. Extension
5. The prehensive nature of extension
6. Physical time
PART TWO. METAPHYSICAL REALIZATION
7. Extension in Whitehead's Metaphysics
8. Epochal Temporalization
8.1 Unity and Diversity; 8.2 Present Space; 8.3 Succession of Epochs; 8.4
Whole and Part
PART THREE. EXTENSION AND EPOCH
9. Extensive Atoms?
9.1 V.C. Chappell; 9.2 D.A. Sipfle; 9.3 F. Bradford Wallack
10. Event and Object
1. Introduction
The formal structure of Whitehead's "actual occasion" has raised
many questions. It seems as if Whitehead attributes contradictory
properties to actual occasions. On the one hand, they are said to be not
in physical time (Process 283); on the other hand Whitehead says that they
are temporal ("Time" 242). This apparent contradiction points to
a general problem which implies many closely related sub-questions. For
example, to mention just a few of a them:
- What is the general relation of the actual occasions
to time? Is time "in" the actual occasions or are the actual
occasions "in" time? Are they in physical time? What actually is
meant by physical time?
- Does the finality and atomicity of the actual occasions mean that they
are not temporally extensive?
- If time is excluded from the actual occasions, then how can the
succession of actual occasions in an enduring object form a uniserial
time-system?
- Is the genesis of the actual occasion to be understood as a complex
unity with an internal diversity?
- If so, is this diversity a diversity of phases? What is the relation
between these phases? Are they successive? Or does the atomicity of the
actual occasions mean that there can be no internal succession?
- Does the atomicity of the actual occasions mean that there is a
discontinuity in the succession of them in an enduring object?
In the present article we will focus on the first four
of these questions. They all circle around the epochal nature of the
actual occasion. Many writers have been stirred into action by them. The
interpretations, as well as the solutions for the difficulties are quite
diverse. Chappell , Sipfle , Wallack , Christian , Ford , and Neville have
all given important contributions. Though most of these views were
expressed quite some time ago, they are still relevant since they give
shape to the basic questions involved. Therefore, although I believe that
these writers have missed the key to the solution, namely the relation
between events and objects, I will discuss the views of some of them
before explaining my own.
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