Toward a Constructive Postmodern Pluralism

Zhihe Wang

Pardon him, Theodotus: he is a barbarian, and thinks that the customs of his tribe

and  island are  the laws of nature.

-- G.B.Shaw, Caesar and Cleopatra

The problem of pluralism is “one of the burning issues of our time.”[1] Recently more and more religious thinkers and theologians have participated in the discussion of religious pluralism.  Without a doubt, pluralism is worthy of our sympathy insofar as it is the rejection of the religious exclusivism and inclusivism propagated by a modern worldview people, especially when many of us have not yet been repented various imperialisms.[2][3] John Hick can be viewed as the representative of the religious universalism while Heim can be viewed as the representative of religious particularism. The solution to the dilemma calls for a new perspective. In this paper I intend to suggest a constructive postmodern pluralism coming from Whiteheadian-Cobbian-Griffinian perspectives.  I will begin by outlining both Hick and Heim’s point of views, including the strong points and weaknesses of their views, and then argue that constructive postmodern pluralism can overcome the impasse by avoiding the weaknesses both of

universalism and particularism. I will conclude that constructive postmodern pluralism opens the possibility of constructing a pluralistic global theology not only by demythologizing and deabsolutizing the primacy of each religion, but also by acknowledging and learning from the other’s strong points.

Hick’s universalistic pluralism

Hick bases his universalistic pluralism on the rejection of religious exclusivism. In his opinion, a philosopher of religion must today take account not only of the thought and experience of the tradition within which he or she happens to work, “but in principle of the religious experience and thought of the whole  human race.”[4] He stresses that we need to go beyond the dominant self-understanding of each tradition, for each has come over the centuries to regard itself as uniquely superior to the others.[5] He emphasizes that it is time to deemphasize each religion’s own absolute and exclusive claim, and make it realize itself as one among many. [6]

Hick proposed his “Copernican revolution” in theology by emphasizing the necessity of a paradigm shift from a Christianity-centered or Jesus-centered to a God-centered model of the universe of faiths. He believes that “the universe of faiths centers upon God, and not upon Christianity or upon any other religion. God is regarded as the sun, the one divine reality, he calls “the Real”. He regards the great world religions as different human responses to the one divine reality. This is why he loves the ancient proverb: “ The lamps are different, but the light is the same”[7]

For Hick, universalism is a remedy to particularism. Using Wittgenstein’s conception of “family-resemblance” and Tillich’s “concept of the ultimate”, Hick asserts that there is something in common among different religions, concretely, there is one absolute or some common denominator or common essence for world religions. In his own words, the differences between the root concepts and experiences of the different religions, their different and often conflicting historical and trans-historical beliefs, their incommensurable mythologies, and the diverse and ramifying belief-systems into which all these are built, are compatible with the pluralistic hypothesis that the great world traditions constitute different conceptions and perceptions of, and responses to, “the Real from within the different cultural ways of being human.”[8] For Hick, it would be impossible to compare different religions if there were no  such a reality common to all religions. In summary, Hick’s universalistic pluralism regards all the religions as different totalities consisting of different ways of conceiving and experiencing the Real.

Hick is right in that he urges us to go beyond the confessional and toward the truth-seeking stance in interfaith dialogue because in confessional dialogue, everyone is convinced that only his or her  own faith has truth or absolute truth while all others have no or only relative  truth. The point is that Hick fails to pay attention to the concrete differences between religions. What he does is to homogenize them into a false unity by fitting all religions into a common pattern. It is clear that Hick is fond of seeking common essence. But, from the perspective of Hegel’s dialectic, a common essence to all religions obviously is a kind of “pure essence”. In Hegel, “In part, essence must contain difference within itself”[9] In this sense, we can say, the so-called “universal common” to all religions is “the abstraction of a pure, inward oscillation, or of pure self-thinking.”[10] Armand Mattelart’s  words are helpful for us to understand Hegel’s rejection of abstract identity: “If it is incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the  prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it  consists in  identifying the other purely and simply with one’s own ‘ego ideal’( or with oneself).”[11] According to Griffin, Hick’s hypothesis is neither adequate nor self-consistent. Hick tries to make all religions equal, but only by making them equally erroneous..

Heim’s particularistic pluralism

In contrast, Heim’s particularistic pluralism can be conceived as the outcome of battling with Hick’s universalism. For Heim, Hick’s assumptions are questionable. Heim disagrees with Hick that there can be only one religious object which he calls “the Real”. There can be only one religious end— “salvation.” In Heim’s opinion, a more pluralistic hypothesis would be that “there can be a variety of actual but different religious fulfillments, salvations.”[12] Based on his hypothesis, Heim criticizes pluralists that

of the vast religious diversity of the world, the pluralists affirms as fully valid only that narrow segment where believers have approximated the authors’ approach to their own traditions. According to them, the many faiths of the world—even in their exclusivist versions—may all save in some sense. But they do so only according to a plan the pluralist understands and others don’t. It is clearly stated that those without a pluralistic understanding of their faith stand urgently in need of fulfillment and enlightenment.[13]

Heim’s intention is to move beyond the limits of the pluralistic agenda, but he goes too far. Heim emphasizes that “ respect for these exclusivist dimensions is the necessary correlative of respect for the diversity of faith traditions in their concrete, historical actuality.”[14] He asks, “Does one invite the basic religious convictions into the fundamental discussion or claim to exclude them until the ground rules and agenda in some way have been set?” Heim believes that this is a definitive fork in the understanding of “pluralism”.[15]

Although Heim claims that “such a view of particularistic religious convictions does not limit the transformative power of interreligious encounter, or assumes that  one’s own convictions are  fixed in some complacent form,”[16] and he claims his perspective “does not  fit easily  into traditional theology”, it is evident that his particularistic pluralism is a new form of exclusivism. According to Heim, “ any religious tradition’s “exclusivist” dimension, its presumption that it constitutes a “one and only” path toward a distinctive –rather than generic—religious end is valid.” He is definitely aware that he is defending a claim which in the current climate is seen as highly paradoxical: “respect for these exclusivist dimensions is the necessary correlative of respect for the diversity of faith traditions in their concrete, historical actuality.”[17]

From such a point of view, Heim fails to explain the interactions, including conflicts, among different religions. It is easy for his theory to lead to irresponsibility: "Never mind about the others; they follow a different drummer. Our job is to follow ours." It is clear that such an attitude would not be irresponsible not only historically, [18] but also morally.

The impasse between Hick’s universalistic religious pluralism and Heim’s particularistic religious pluralism calls for a new approach which can transcend both universalistic emphasis on common essence of all religions and particularistic emphasis on the superiority of each religion. At the same time it should direct pluralism toward healthier and more constructive development. Constructive postmodern pluralism is the best candidate, at least from my perspective.

Constructive Postmodern Pluralism

Although some scholars are not keen on the term “postmodern” because it means “such different things to different people”[19], I still use the term because it enables  us to theoretically clarify some confusions in  discussing the problem of pluralism.

First, it is helpful in distinguishing (at least in principle) two kinds of pluralisms: modern pluralism that is fond of seeking the common essence or common ground, the only perspective, the only ultimate reality, and postmodern pluralism that rejects any search for common essence based on the emphasis on difference and particularity. From this distinction, it is clear that Hick’s universalistic religious pluralism is modern while Heim’s particularistic religious pluralism is postmodern, although they are contemporary.  Beyond question, no sharp line can be drawn between modern pluralism and postmodern pluralism. Some thoughts of modern pluralists may be postmodern while some thoughts of postmodern pluralists may be modern. For example, Prof. Cobb, in my judgement, is a typical postmodern pluralist. But when Cobb uses terminology such as “Christocentrism” and “superiority” of Christianity, he fails to get rid of modern pluralism. With this distinction, we can avoid Heim’s embarrassment, or as Griffin points out, “paradoxical feature”. [20]That is, on the one hand, he criticizes and tries to move beyond pluralism; on the other hand, he considers pluralism a good thing, a “more pluralistic hypothesis.” However if Heim calls his pluralism “postmodern pluralism”, he could avoid this paradox.

Indeed, Heim is a postmodernist in the sense that he rejects the basic assumptions of modernity. At least he is influenced deeply by the postmodern movement. In Salvations, he writes, “There is a great deal of discussion today about ‘post-modernity and about the possibility changes which may follow the dethroning of North Atlantic views of history, knowledge, and justice from their supposed universal status through a recognition of valid alternatives from other culture.” He continues, “ Insofar as such a transformation were actually to take place, pluralistic theologies would seem to be among the most likely casualty of the codes of modern rationality. Ironically, pluralistic antidotes to Christian particularism may prove to be much more culture and time bound than the theologies they condemn.”[21] In his opinion, “the primary roots” of modern pluralism “ lie in the European enlightenment, the modern Christian missionary movement, and the explosive expansion of Western economic systems and colonial power.”[22] It is evident that Heim’s strategy is the one of deconstruction. He is fond of finding the difference. It is very important to note that Heim’s postmodernism is deconstructive because it shares a great deal with deconstructive postmodernistic assumptions, such as the emphasis on difference.

In contrast, Hick’s universalistic pluralism can be viewed as modern pluralism due to the fact it shares a lot of the nature of modernity. Since constructive postmodern pluralism is neither modern, nor deconstructive postmodern, it can move beyond Hick’s universalism and Heim’s particularism. I will discuss these qualities of constructive postmodern pluralism in order.

First, Constructive postmodern pluralism is postmodern in that it rejects modernity’s dalliance with the quest for absolute clarity(meaning) and certainty(truth),that, since Plato, has often been seen as the very heart of philosophy itself;[23] more specifically, it rejects cultural  arrogance and imperialism. This make constructive postmodern pluralism different from modern pluralism. For the most part, philosophers and religious thinkers have displayed a lack of interest in the link between modernity and exclusivism. In my judgement, the critique of traditional Christianity will become more convincing if we relate it to the critique of modernity made by postmodernism, especially by constructive postmodernism. Cobb tries to go beyond modernism because he is deeply aware of the real problem of utmost urgency our time faces. He is aware of the pain modernity left for humanity. Griffin also draws our attention to the link between the ideology of pluralism and a voracious, omnivorous modernity, “whose surface tolerance of all religions is indistinguishable from a profound hostility to all.”[24][25] but also provides a basis for postmodern pluralism. Pluralism can not be understood well without understanding the postmodern movement. The reason why Hick fails to answer the charge that “”religious pluralism is an ally of international capitalism,”[26] is in that he bases his universalistic religious pluralism on some of the basic assumptions of modernity.

Second, Constructive postmodern pluralism is also pluralistic in that it abandons absolutism and exclusivism, the idea that Christianity is the only religious tradition and tends to replace all the others. Constructive postmodern pluralism encourages to respect and reserve the real differences and the uniqueness among religions, to open to  others and learn from others. It “allows each religious tradition to define its own nature and purposes and roles of religious element within it.”[27] The pluralistic character makes constructive postmodern pluralism different from monism, exlusivism and inclusivism.

Third, Constructive postmodern pluralism is constructive in that it advocates an active attitude and the actions so urgently needed for “creative response to the world crisis.”[28] Cobb complains that we do more to encourage and exemplify a debilitating relativism than to precipitate a process of creative response.”[29] The constructiveness is based on a passion for the Earth and its poor and oppressed people.  “We believe that interreligious understanding can contribute to saving the world.”[30]

In summary, Constructive postmodern pluralism has the virtues of openness, richness and constructiveness. It is these benefits that make constructive postmodern pluralism the antidote to both religious universalism and particularism.

An Antidote to Religious Universalism

From the constructive postmodern perspective of Whitehead-Cobb-Griffin, Hick’s universalistic pluralism is untenable. This is why almost all constructive postmodern pluralists reject religious universalism. Griffin claims  that “ I don’t believe all of the experiences upon which a religion is built are common to humanity, but that some of them are unique to that tradition.”[31] For Griffin, it is impossible that  “the essences of all the historic religions are the same.”[32] For Cobb, the claim that there is a single common ground of all religions,  “is not supported by evidence.” He further points out that it is unwise to assume that underlying all our apparent diversities there already exists a common ground.  Whiteheadian process philosophy provides a philosophical base for Cobb and Griffin’s critique of universalism. Process philosophy  tells us that the novelty of an actual occasion resides in its prehension of its past actual world, its subjective form, subjective aim, and its satisfaction. No two actual occasions have exactly the same data of feeling. The subjective form of feeling is also different.

Constructive postmodern pluralism stresses the diversity of experience. Experiences are different due to the fact that “Every concrete moment of experience is heavily shaped by one’s language and thereby culture”[33][34]  Accordingly, constructive postmodern pluralism also emphasizes novelty. In Cobb’s words, “what is most valuable and interesting in the two communities is not what they have in common but what they can offer to each other as new.”[35] This explains why dialogue between different religions is necessary. Since there is no common essence of all religion, “Hence there are essential things which could in principle be learned from each other.”[36] We can learn something new and different from the process of dialogue. That is, that constructive postmodern pluralism leaves room for something new and significant to be gained from other religions. In this sense, we can say that constructive postmodern pluralism not only provides the basis for interreligious dialogue, but also opens up possibility for genuine openness.

A Remedy to Particularism

Heim’s pluralism is “a kind of religious particularism,”[37] which presents itself as a denial of religious universalism, but it carries too far. Heim stresses that the superiority, the “finality of Christ” and the “ independent validity of other religions” are not mutually excusive.[38] He even emphasizes that exclusiveness in each religion is necessary. It is obvious that Heim goes to another extreme in rejecting a common essence of religions. As Cobb once acutely pointed out  that “emphasizing this absence of common ground returns us to a dangerous parochialism.”[39] Religious particularism can be seen as a kind of parochialism. From the perspective of constructive postmodern pluralism, the epistemological root of particularism is its emphasis on difference and particularity.

With panexperientialism, constructive postmodern pluralism is effective in undermining religious particularism. By panexperientialism, according to Griffin, is the view that nature is actual and that “the ultimate units of nature are not vacuous but are something for themselves in the sense of having experience, however slight."[40]position that “the ultimate units of the world contain experience (and perhaps spontaneity)”.[41]

We can draw at least two important positions from panexperientialism. First, there is something common in the world. Everything is interrelated with everything else in some way. That is, “There is a set of experiences that we all do share in common, that are more fundamental than those dimensions of experience which are culturally conditioned.”[42] Second, we do have a direct, presensory, prelinguistic, preinterpretative experience of reality. This experience is common to all people; in Griffin’s words,  “there is a complex of elements which are in fact experienced by all people, regardless of whether this experience rises to  the conscious level, and  regardless of whether one  verbally denies having this experience.”[43]Likewise, though Cobb battles with the effort to find the common essence or common ground of all religious traditions, he does not deny that “there are common elements” in different religions.[44] In this sense, Abe’s criticism of Cobb is untenable. According to Abe,  “ If the very quest for what is common is the problem, and we should abandon that quest in order to truly accept pluralism, we must be led to a mere diversity without unity. This implies a relativism in the negative sense, because a diversity without unity entails skepticism or anarchy in value judgment. It is, however, human nature or innate character to seek an integral and comprehensive understanding of human life and the universe.”[45] Abe misreads Cobb because Cobb never denies that there is something common among different religions. What he denies is the prior common essence of all religions. Moreover, the fact that he stresses that there is no common essence at the beginning does not mean that there will be common essence in the end. The increasingly tendency of globalization as “ one of the truism of our time”[46]

also provides strong evidence and support for the notion that we human beings do share something in common. As Anderson states, “We have been witnessing that an event of great significance--some kind of a global civilization-- is coming into being.”  That is to say, global problems call for global solutions. It is not thinkers’ subjective will but the objective crisis situation facing us at global level that determines there must be at least some common responses among different religions to the crisis situation.

Acceptance of particulism not only has no philosophical ground, but also would deprive us of one of the bases—perhaps what have been the most effective bases—for overcoming “the beliefs responsible for the destructive, unattractive side of Christianity.”[47] Constructive postmodern pluralism acutely points out that Heim’s religious pluralism encourages members of each religion to retreat into their own ghettoes.

From the point of view of Whiteheadian process philosophy, Heim’s particularism is untenable. In Whitehead, the process of a new concrescence starts with the prehension of a complex network of actual entities. “The essence of an actuality,” Whitehead says, “ consists solely in the fact that it is a prehending thing.” Also he emphasizes that “we must say that every actual  entity is  present in every other actual entity. The Philosophy of organism is mainly devoted to the task of making clear the notion of ‘Being present in another entity.’”[48]  We are all actual occasions of experience, according to panexperientialism. We share experience with molecules, family, clan, community, bioregion, region, nation, continent, planet, and cosmos. Likewise, we also share experience with other religion.

Moreover, from the perspective of Griffin’s panexperientialism, Heim’s particularistic pluralism falls prey to logocentrism, in which reason and language have priority over experience and feeling, theory has priority over practice. Concretely, Heim reduces the issue of pluralism to the theoretical and intellectual question of the pluralism of perspectives and truth, and “remains indifferent to the problem of the social, practical context and consequences (justice) of conflicting orientations or perspectives.”[49] In contrast, for Cobb, it is more urgent that attention be directed toward events in the natural and social worlds than in the language world.

In addition, Heim’s religious particularism is questionable because of its claim for its own priority. Constructive postmodern pluralism would question Heim: what is the difference between his particularism and a  “bigotry and closed-mindedness” stance?  It is obvious that when one religion holds to its superiority, diversity in that religion is inevitably limited and a pluralistic relation to others is hard to maintain. According to Griffin, “every theological perspective both reveals and conceals. It helps one become conscious of certain dimensions of our common preinterpretative experience while also making it difficult to acknowledge other dimensions.” [50][51] The best way to avoid such a tendency is to be open to others, to learn from others rather than to exclude the others.

From the perspective of constructive postmodern pluralism, although there is big difference between Hick’s universalism and Heim’s particularism (one stresses the universality of all religions, the other underscores the uniqueness of each one) they share something in common.

First, both of them exaggerate one aspect of experience. Experience has two polar dimensions: particular experience and common experience. Universalism can be seen as emphasizing the universal dimension at the expense of the truth in particularism, while particularism can be seen as emphasizing the particular dimension at the expense of the truth in universalism. Concretely, universalists exaggerate the finite, special, and temporary truth coming from the concrete historical context into the infinite, universal, and eternal truth. By contrast, particularistic exaggerates the self-sufficiency of each religion by ignoring the interrelateness between religions. This exaggeration is so fateful because it has led to exlusivism and selfcenterism. The second common point they share is self-centrism. Hick’s universalism is a kind of expansionist self-centrism while Heim’s religious particularism can be conceived of a new form of exclusive self-centrism. There is little doubt that self-centrism will block a genuine openness to the others. Constructive postmodern pluralism asserts that there is no true religion beyond the historical form of particular religions.

Constructive postmodern pluralism also reveals the link between religious self-centrisms or exclusivisms and individualism. It stresses that various religious self-centrisms and exclusivisms correspond exactly with the modern radical individualism dominant in modern Western world, which extremely priorized individuals and “disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friend; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.”[52][53]  In this respect, the constructive postmodern notion of interrelatedness in the light of process philosophy will play a significant and crucial role. In constructive postmodern pluralism, community and the inherent relationship with others are highly prized.

Third, both of them are the victim of substance thinking. Substance thinking is "a mechanistic model of reality,"[54] according to which there is an independent, unchanging ultimate reality. That ultimate reality is called "substance".

The influence of substance thinking on modern western thought is enormous, due to which one tends to think of something as self-contained and self-sufficient. Self-centrism is also the product of substance thinking. One of the major difficulties of substance thinking consists in failing to explain the interconnectedness among things. Substance thinking views relations as external to substance. The substance is what it is independently of relations and then enters into relations. These relations do not affect its fundamental nature or existence.

In the case of universalism and particularism, “The Real” Hick sticks to is a kind of substance. The particularistic Christianity Heim holds is a kind of substance, too. Both of them are self-contained and self-sufficient. The relational worldview of process philosophy is an effective antidote to substance thinking.

According to constructive postmodern pluralism, there is no place for the self-contained substance in the real world.  Each entity is constituted by its internal  relation. To say that an individual entity has intrinsic value because it feels or experiences its environment is to say that it takes account of its environment internally in such a way as to so constitute itself.[55]From such a point of view, both Hick’s universalism and Heim’s particualarism are untenable. Both of them are closed minded and “presupposed that we had nothing essential to learn from the other.”[56]

Fourth, both universalism and particularism fall prey to reductionism. Both of them reduce rich human experience to their narrow channel. They ignore the role of feeling and prelinguistic experience in human life. Hick reduces rich and diverse human experience to common experience on the level of reason while Heim reduces it to particular experience by rejecting common human experiences among human beings. The former reduces a religion as organic totality to a universal essence. The latter reduces the organic totality to particularity.

Particularism is a kind of reductionism in the sense that it reduces the issue of pluralism that has complex meaning to the theoretical and intellectual question of the pluralism of perspectives and truth. In contrast, Constructive postmodern pluralism dissatisfies simplification. Whitehead once warns that all simple doctrines are “shipwrecked on the rock of the problem of evil.” According to Griffin, “The same kind of simplicity, it now seems, is equally shipwrecked on the rock of the  problem of religious pluralism.”[57] Reality is very complex. Any attempt to comprehend it in one system will be in vain. Likewise, religion and the relationship between religions are complex, any attempt to oversimplify them will be doomed to failure.. Constructive postmodern pluralism has a vastly enlarged notion of experience while modernity reduced experience to that which received and clinical examined through the five senses. The postmodern notion of experience, as Griffin rightly states, not only includes intellectual and linguistic experiences, but also includes presensory and prelinguistic experiences, not only scientific experiences, but also religious experiences. It is a rich whole. Bernard Meland’s vision also makes the point clear. According to him, Postmodern Experience has a wholistic character,

“implying not just  the  discernible and describable datum available to any mode of empirical inquiry, but that  discernible datum in the  full , ongoing context of what ever is involved, whether discernible or not.”[58]

An Antidote to Deconstructive Postmodernism

It goes without saying that constructive postmodern pluralism shares a lot of convergences with deconstructive postmodernism. Both of them reject modernity. Cobb affirms the importance and value of deconstruction[59][60] Cobb acknowledges the positive function of deconstruction in helping us see things as they are, enabling us to see more clearly. Deconstruction is regarded as an essential element in a response to global crisis. However, Cobb emphasis, “The urgency of such deconstruction can hardly be exaggerated”[61] Further, he urges us to be cautious of deconstructive postmodernism because “when deconstruction is viewed not as a powerful and essential element in the needed response to relativism but as a comprehensive program excluding all other approaches, it ceases to function as a great aid and becomes a part of the threat.”[62] This means that, despite this likeness, they have marked differences .In the following three respects constructive postmodernism challenges deconstructive postmodernism.

First of all, against deconstructive postmodernism that is indifferent to the problem of religious pluralism, constructive postmodern pluralism actively participates in the discussion on religious pluralism. Constructive postmodern pluralists have published a great deal of writings on religious pluralism and suggested a number of alternatives to the problem of religious pluralism. Second, deconstructive postmodernism “has encouraged ways of thinking that direct attention away from natural and social events;”[63] it pays too much attention to the linguistic world. It is fond of language game.  Conversely, for constructive postmodern pluralism, it is more urgent that attention be directed toward events in the natural and social worlds than in the language world. Cobb points out that we do more to encourage and exemplify a debilitating relativism than to precipitate a process of creative response.

Against deconstructive postmodernism that adheres to deconstructing, that is, “turn everything you’ve ever learned around”, [64]constructive postmodern pluralism allows us to promote creativity and reject nihilism in order to save the world.

For Whitehead," God's primary commandment is, “ be creativity! And foster creativity in others!” “The use of philosophy” Whitehead emphasizes, “ is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system. It reverses the slow descent of accepted thought towards the inactive commonplace. If you like to phrase it so, philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct insight into depths yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism, not by explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal characterizations, rationally coordinated. Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seeks to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization."[65] Postmodern process hermeneutics as a vital constituent of constructive postmodern pluralism also plays a very important role in advocating creativity, according to which, theory not only represents reality, but also add something to the reality. The process of interpretation is the process of adding something to the reality. Theory helps us to change the present world, to shape postmodern world.       Against deconstructive postmodernism that promotes a binary way of thinking of fragmentation, Constructive postmodern pluralism inspired by the notion of Yin-Yang in Chinese ancient philosophy reinterprets relationship between different religions. From the point of view of Constructive postmodern pluralism, the greatest weakness of  deconstruction consist in its fragmental thinking, in its reductionist thinking. Constructive postmodern pluralism tries to moves beyond the impasse between Christianity and other religions. From the perspective of Yin-Yang, Yin-Yang interrelate each other, reflect each other , contain each other. Each contains within itself the seed of the other. In my judgement, the most important truth the notion of Yin Yang tells us is that all is interrelated, the opposed ones are not  entirely opposite. For example, male and female are opposed, but they are not entirely opposite. This also applies to two religious traditions such as Taoism and Christianity, Buddhism and Muslim.

Conclusion

At the risk of seeming to summarize a summary, let me state in conclusion: the point of this paper is that constructive postmodern pluralism is rich with provocative and insightful theoretical and practical perspective from which we can criticize what went wrong with the  modern project. Constructive postmodern pluralism summons all our imaginative skill and  creation.

It has become evident that both Hick’s universalism and Heim’s particularism are not an adequate response to the challenges that face us. They remind us of the story of Yelang.[66] To some extent, religious exlusivism, self-centrism, particularism all are varieties of Yelangism. This way of thinking has brought great suffering to humanity. It not only blocks one religion from learning the others, but also limits each religion’s creative self-transformation.

Constructive postmodern pluralism is not only helpful in subverting exclusivism and self-centrism, complacency and parochialism, but also is an adequate alternative to the challenges facing us. It will bring true hope to us. Constructive postmodern pluralism help us develop a keen and critical sense of the points at which the modern pluralisms are wading deeper and deeper into the water of bias and difference. Constructive postmodern pluralism not only help us to find positive contact between different religions but also help us to guard form too easy a marriage between different religion.[67] It also serves the positive function of helping us guard against idolatry. Constructive postmodern pluralism is not static but dynamic. After rejecting being imperialistic or exclusivistic  , constructive postmodern pluralism tells to be humble, to be open. It welcomes new perspective and takes seriously accounts of feminist and ecological themes because it realizes that there will be not true religious plurality and pluralism if nature and women remain oppressed.

Constructive postmodern pluralism emphasizes that the understandings and expressions of religions are multivalent. According to which, various understandings of human existence are not simply different ways of understanding a reality, rather, “at least to some extent the different understandings reflect different realities.”[68] Therefore constructive postmodern pluralism stresses interrelation between different religions. It deabsolutizes each religion’s own absolute and exclusive claim while acknowledging and learning its strengths. For constructive postmodern pluralism, to deabsolutize does not mean to relativize. It means to normalize. Such a pluralism will be truly humble and open. It will much easier to be accepted by different religious people at a global level, on which a pluralistic global theology may be based.

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