The Problem of Religious Pluralism Based on Radical Relativism:  An East Asian Case

                                        Wang Shik Jang (Methodist Theological Seminary, Seoul)

One of the main problems associated with religious pluralism in East Asia is the fact that so-called Abrahamic religions (i.e., Christianity and Islam) and traditional East Asian religions (i.e., Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism) are in conflict philosophically.  Apart from the fact that the Abrahamic religions are basically exclusivistic to other religions in theological position, it seems to me that the East Asian religions have been intransigent in their philosophical positions too.  Despite the fact that the idea of religious plurality has been salient in the history of East Asian philosophy, why is it that the East Asian religions are not well harmonized with the Abrahamic religions philosophically?

Some people would think that the reason why the interreligious dialogue has not been successful lies primarily in the Abrahamic religions’ exclusivism.  Although I agree with this analysis, it should also be pointed out that another reason for the failure of inter-religious dialogue is rooted in the East Asian religions themselves.  My thesis is that among the various types of religious pluralism derived from their own philosophy, a religious pluralism, which is not recommendable for the dialogue with the Abrahamic religions today, has still been influential in the main stream of the East Asian religions.  That is to say, the religious pluralism arising from what I call “radical relativism” is the one that is responsible for the failure of interreligious dialogue in East Asia.  Here, by the term “radical relativism,” I refer to the position that “since there is no absolute thing, everything, whether it is a religion, or God, or the world or whatever, is so relative that it does not have its own subjectivity.”  In my opinion, such relativism has brought about many problems to the philosophy of religions in East Asia, resulting in unsuccessful interreligious dialogue.  

Above all, the radical relativism of traditional East Asian religions gives rise to many conflicting truth-claims in the philosophy of religions.  In traditional East Asian religions, the notions of the ultimate, i.e., Tao in Taoism, Tian (the Heaven) in Confucianism, and Sunyata (Emptiness) in Buddhism, which are all based on the doctrine of such relativism, have been interpreted by some philosophers as referring to something non-transcendent or non-real.  Why and how such relativism has resulted in the notion of the ultimate as non-transcendent or non-real will be explained later.  At any rate, given such notions of the ultimate, it is obvious that the East Asian religions are not well harmonized with Abrahamic religions, which usually construe God as transcendent and real.

Considering this, I am sure that an ideal way to formulate a genuine religious pluralism cannot be made possible, unless the problems of such relativism are solved.

In what follows, employing Whitehead’s philosophy, I will attempt to show how we can solve the problem of religious pluralism arising from the radical relativism in East Asia.  In fact, Whitehead brings a strong type of relativism into his own philosophy.  Therefore, his philosophy is, in a sense, free from the attack of relativism.  At the same time, however, it offers a philosophical methodology able to go beyond the problems of the radical relativism.

After showing how and why relativism has been problematic in East Asian religions, I will try to elucidate the way in which a Whiteheadian philosophy of religion can entail an ideal type of relativism that solves the problem of religious pluralism in East Asia.

I. The Relationship between Religion and Relativism in East Asia.

It is true to say that relativism is essential for the establishment of religious pluralism.  The central reason why relativism contributes to religious pluralism is based on its emphasis on the equal validity of all religions.  In other words, the heart of relativism is that “since there is nothing absolute, everything is relative.”  This easily leads to the idea that since “everything is relative, all is equally valid.”  This is why relativism is useful for forming the framework of religious pluralism.

Relativism has been a dominant factor in the philosophy of East Asian religions.  This is due to the fact that a relational worldview has been the core characteristic of East Asian philosophies.  As we know, a relational vision usually insists that a thing does not exist independently without relationship with others.  Therefore, a relational vision easily leads to relativism, in which everything is said to be relative.  Both Taoism and Confucianism have always been based on yin-yang thought, which is obviously the expression of relational vision.  The core of Buddhist thought has also been derived from a relational worldview based on the doctrine of prititya-samutpade (dependent origination).  If this is the case, then we can assume that it is quite natural for religious pluralism to arise in East Asian religions.

However, the result has not been the matter of course.  This is because not only is every religion dominated by its philosophy, but it is also ruled by the system of its faith.  This is an important feature of religion.  In addition to it, since the system of faith is usually dogmatic, it is not easy for a religion to be tolerant to other religions.  This is another important feature of religion.  These features can be discovered even in Buddhist religions, which have been noted as one of the most tolerant religions so far.  Truly, many people would think that historically Buddhism has always taken side with religious pluralism.  However, sometimes this has not been the case.  One the contrary, Buddhist religions have often taken a kind of exclusive attitude to other religions.  In the Lotus Sutra, one of the most influential Buddhist Scriptures, this is expressed as follows:

In the Buddha-lands of the universe

There is only the One-vehicle Law,

Neither a second nor a third,

Except the tactful teachings of the Buddha.

But by provisional expressions

He has led all loving creatures,

Revealing the Buddha-wisdom.

In the appearing of buddhas in the world

Only this One is the real fact,

For the other two are not the true.[1]

Of course, here, we do not see any kind of strong exclusivism.  For it is said that the Buddha accepts all other small vehicles as a provisional way at least.  However, here, not only is it eventually emphasized that there is only “One” which is “the real fact,” but also it is stressed that all others are “not the true.”  As this illustrates, Buddhist religions have not always been pluralistic.

However, is there any other faith that has been more tolerant to other faiths than Buddhism in the history of religion?  It is not easy to deny that Buddhism has been one of the most “inclusive” religions, in which the plurality and multiplicity of faiths are recognized.  This has been made possible simply because the heart of Buddhist philosophy has always been associated with the doctrine of dependent origination and Emptiness that leads to relativism.  It is not an exaggeration to say that this is true.  Therefore, one of the best ways to embody the reality of religious pluralism is to recover the spirit of relativism.

Nevertheless, we have to be very cautious here, because relativism does not always make religious pluralism successful.  Indeed, my argument in this essay is that an inadequate type of relativism has been an obstacle to achieve the reality of pluralism in East Asian religions.  This is to say that a certain kind of relativism can cause a lot of trouble to the interreligious dialogue among religions in East Asia.  In my opinion, therefore, it was when a radical type of Buddhist relativism was introduced that relativism began to be problematic in East Asia.  This radical type of relativism is discovered in Zen Buddhism.  However, before articulating how this particular relativism was developed in Zen Buddhism, I would unpack what I mean here by the term “radical relativism.”

As we saw above, by relativism we usually refer to the philosophical position that “since there is nothing absolute, everything is relative.”  However, what relativism implies can be divided into two different meanings, depending on perspectives.  

First, by the term relativism we may mean that everything is conditioned, or limited. Such a meaning of relativism can be made possible, because to say that everything is relative is nothing other than to say that the existence of an entity is so dependent upon others that it is conditioned by them.  Such an interpretation of relativism is very helpful for the spirit of religious pluralism.  For it can be emphasized that, since one religion’s truth is limited, there is no “one and only” true religion, and, therefore, every religion has its own distinctive value.  

However, another meaning of relativism is available too:  If there is nothing absolute, everything does not have its own subjectivity.  This second meaning of relativism is available when we focus on the fact that since everything is relative, it would be impossible for us to affirm the existence of something independent.  Usually, the denial of something independent is made possible, insofar as the idea that the existence of an entity conditioned by others tends to lead to another idea that the independence of an entity cannot be affirmed.  Eventually, this relativism proceeds to claim that since the independence of an entity is subject to others, we should also affirm that everything does not have its own subjectivity.

Now, some would be ready to guess why I called this kind of relativism a radical Buddhist type.  It is a “Buddhist” type because the relativism denies that everything has its own subjectivity.  It is “radical” because the relativism goes to the extreme.  Some might say that here I am unduly fussy.  They would think that although most of Buddhist philosophy has denied the subjectivity of an entity in some sense, its philosophy does not give rise to such kind of radical relativism.  However, it is not an exaggeration to say that this relativism is pervasive in the mindset of many Buddhist thinkers.

One example can be found in Francis Cook, a representative of Hua-yen Buddhism in the West.  When he talks about the existence of the ultimate, he mentions such a radical type of relativism.  “The true ultimate must be one which is exactly and literally identical with the nonultimate.”[2] Although he does not allude to the relativism in relation to religious pluralism, it is obvious that his philosophical position belongs to the category of such a kind of relativism.  For he asserts that the existence of the ultimate, which is infinite, is identical with the finite.  This kind of radical relativism is, as it will be spelled out later, problematic when it is applied to interreligious dialogue, because its philosophy of religion does not harmonize with that of Abrahamic religions.  This is why I claim that such relativism is not appropriate for setting up the ideal type of religious pluralism in East Asian religions.

Here, an important thing to notice is that such a radical relativism is not discoverable only in Buddhist thinkers.  It is pervasive in the mindset of many thinkers in other Asian religions too.  One example is to be found in David Hall and Roger Ames, who have published many books concerning the philosophy of East Asian religions.  According to them, the notion of transcendence is irrelevant in interpreting the philosophy of religions in East Asia.  Based on this assumption, they argue that the notion of world order in East Asian religions is altogether this worldly.  According to Hall and Ames, Tian (Heaven), which has been traditionally regarded as an ultimate in Confucianism and Taoism, is both what our world is and how it is.  The myriad things are not the creatures of Tian or disciplined by Tian that is independent of what is ordered; rather, they are constitutive of it.  Tian is the field of creatures.[3]

In my opinion, such an interpretation, based on radical relativism, is not only irrelevant in the interpretation of the philosophy of religion in East Asia, but also problematic in achieving a successful interreligious dialogue in it.  For this reason, this radical relativism is not recommendable for bringing about an ideal type of religious pluralism.

So far, I have attempted to show how a radical kind of relativism has been introduced into the philosophy of religion in East Asia.  At the same time, what I have argued is that such a relativism is not recommendable.  With this argument, I am indicating that an alternative type of relativism may be developed.  This is to be articulated later.  Before doing that, however, the next task this essay will undergo is clarifying the philosophical problems of radical relativism.

2. A Critique of Radical Relativism in Traditional East Asian Religions.

The central characteristic of the radical relativism in traditional Asian religions is that it usually affirms both the denial of subjectivity and the denial of transcendence.  In my opinion, this is the root of all problems.  Let us first see the problem created from the denial of transcendence.

In some Buddhist cases, the denial of transcendence is expressed as claiming that there is no difference between the ultimate and the non-ultimate.  This is based on the principle of universal relativity.  The radical relativism rooted in this principle, such as that of Francis Cook, insists that if everything is relative, then, the principle of universal relativity must apply to the dimension of the ultimate.  With this assumption, it is finally asserted that there is no difference between the ultimate as the transcendent and what it transcends.

 The first problem created from the denial of differentiation between the ultimate and the non-ultimate is that if the differentiation is denied, then, we are eventually to be confronted with the denial of the differentiation between good and evil.  This problem arises because the denial of a transcendent dimension gives rise to the denial of the existence of good, as such, finally making the differentiation between good and evil ambiguous.  Let us see why this happens.

According to Francis Cook, he sees the ultimate even in his cat, Leo.[4]  This is because he, like most Buddhists, is able to employ the doctrine of Emptiness when he wants to see an ultimate dimension.  In other words, based on the doctrine of Emptiness, which is also the principle of universal relativity, Cook identifies the cat as the finite with the ultimate as the infinite.

Of course, I agree with the fact that we can experience a case in which the finite can be identified with the ultimate.  If, in accordance with Buddhist doctrine, we have an ability to discover Emptiness, which is the ultimate dimension for Buddhists, then we may see the ultimate even in sentient beings.  Therefore, it is true to say that the finite can be identified with the ultimate in some sense.  However, there is also a case in which the finite cannot be identified with the ultimate. In other words, although it is not impossible to say that an immoral sentient being, who committed an unnecessary crime, may even be identified with the ultimate, it would be much more reasonable to say that he cannot be identified with the ultimate in most cases.  Therefore, we should say that the denial of differentiation between the transcendent and non-transcendent is not recommendable ethically.  And, for this reason, the denial of the existence of transcendence is not persuasive philosophically either.

Considering this problem arising from the denial of the existence of transcendence, some philosophers of East Asian religions tend to solve it in the following way.  That is to say, they concede that the existence of transcendence may be affirmed in traditional East Asian religions.  However, they insist that although that is the case, its existence should be confined to the category of immanence.  This is exactly what David Hall and Roger Ames have insisted.

According to Hall and Ames, a “strict” transcendence does not exist in the East Asian religions.  All we can find out in them is “immanent” transcendence, which means that transcendence in the East Asian religions exists only in relationship with what it transcends.[5]  I agree that what has been prevailing in the main stream of East Asian religions is exactly an “immanent” transcendence.  However, it is equally fair to say that the tendency of the so-called “strict” sense of transcendence has also been strong in the East Asian religions.  This fact can be verified in the Book of Shijing and Shujing, both of which have been very influential as Confucian Scriptures in East Asia.  Chu His’s Neo-Confucianism is another example.  Even in Pure Land Buddhist tradition, which has been very powerful as a Buddhist religion in Korea and Japan, we can discover the idea of such a strict type of transcendence.  

However, the most important problem created from an over-emphasis on immanent transcendence is that it may lead to the denial of any kind of transcendence.  For there is no significant difference between the statement that the existence of transcendence can be denied and the statement that there is no “strict” sense of transcendence.  This is because both statements eventually entail the same result, i.e., the denial of the reality of transcendence.   The denial of a “strict” transcendence is identical with the denial of the independent reality of transcendence in the sense that it does not affirm the transcendent differentiated from what it transcends.  The main reason for not making the differentiation between them comes from the relativist’s philosophical distrust that the reality of transcendence can be verified.  However, in my opinion, if we do not affirm the reality of transcendence, then we are faced with many problems.  A case can be found out in some Buddhists.  

Of course, there are many reasons why some Buddhists are not sure of the reality of transcendence.  However, according to Don Cupitt, who has called himself a Buddhist Christian or a Christian Buddhist, one of the most important epistemological reasons for claiming the non-realist interpretation of religion is that it is impossible for him to predicate that which transcends human reasoning.  He insists that since the reality of transcendence cannot be affirmed or denied, all we can affirm is that it is non-real.[6]

However, it seems to me that although a non-realist interpretation of the transcendent might be appealing philosophically, it is not persuasive religiously.  That is to say, if all we can affirm is, due to the impossibility of predication, merely the non-reality of transcendence, then this is nothing else than to say that we cannot apply human category to the transcendent.  And, if so, this means that there is no basis for assuring that there exists the transcendent that is able to care about what is happening in this world.  Furthermore, as David Griffin once said, “if the ultimate reality does not have the property of being good, then we have no reason for assuming that it would be interested in bringing all sentient beings to fulfillment.”[7]

Finally, with regard to the issue of the radical relativism based on the denial of subjectivity, the most significant problem arises when it is applied to the interreligious dialogue.  By virtue of the principle of universal relativity, this relativism has a tendency to undermine the independent subjectivity of a thing.  And, based on this tendency, this radical relativism easily results in weakening the uniqueness of one’s own perspective.  This is made possible because it emphasizes that we cannot be sure of the independent subjectivity of an entity.

Of course, it goes without saying that with regard to the issue of interreligious dialogue, such a relativist position is worthwhile sometimes in the sense that it may make some contribution to relativizing one’s dogmatic position and, therefore, break the shackles of absolutist thinking.  However, a problem would be that it could also give rise to demeaning the positive value of one’s perspective.  This easily leads to undermining the religious passion of sincere believers.  Therefore, as John Cobb points out, when we misuse a relativism, we can encourage disengagement from all commitment instead of eliciting strong convictions.[8]

 So far, I have made an attempt to show how the radical kind of relativism has caused many problems with respect to the philosophy of religions.  However, the problems caused by radical relativism in relation to the philosophy of religion have functioned as an obstacle to the interreligious dialogue in East Asia.  As we have seen, the denial of transcendence, the denial of differentiation between the ultimate and non-ultimate, and the philosophy of non-realism, which have all been the product of the radical relativism, are not well harmonized with the position of Abrahamic religions.  Therefore, if we want to formulate an ideal type of religious pluralism, we first have to suggest an alternative to the radical kind of relativism that has been a background factor giving rise to the conflict between traditional East Asian religions and Abrahamic religions.  Now, let us turn to this issue.

3. A Whiteheadian Solution to the Problem of Radical Relativism in East Asia.

We live a world in which relativism is not avoidable. Some would even say that relativism has been proved not only as a cultural fact but also as a philosophical truth. I can also agree with this in some sense.  Especially, when applied to the interreligious dialogue, relativism has been regarded as unavoidable because it is obvious that it promotes the realization of religious pluralism.  Therefore, although I said that we needed to find an alternative philosophy to a radical kind of relativism, it should not be taken to imply that the alternative is to stay away from relativism.  On the contrary, the first condition to be met for setting up the alternative is to positively include relativism into itself.

 Whitehead is one of the most provocative figures who have internalized a typical relativism into their own philosophical system in the history of Western philosophy.  For him, to be a thing is to be a unification of many other things.  In technical terms, each occasion can be analyzed into its prehensions of antecedent occasions, which themselves can be analyzed into other antecedent occasions.  Therefore, a thing cannot be conceived without reference to other things.  In a word, it is conditioned by others.  Up until this point, his philosophy seems merely one of the ordinary types of a relational worldview.  However, his relational worldview turns out to be a strong relativism when it is reinforced by the theory of process.  

 The core of Whitehead’s theory of process is his recognition that as soon as an occasion achieves its own reality, it perishes, losing its “subjective immediacy.”  This implies that an occasion is never given a chance to get its own being.  When it is coming into existence, it is not a being yet. When it obtains its existence, its own subjectivity is already gone.  This is not to say that it does not possess any kind of “being.” However, according to Whitehead, all an occasion can have with regard to its own being is only its function as a datum for other occasions.  This is why we can say that Whitehead’s philosophy offers a strong kind of relativism.  It is a strong relativism, since not only does it emphasize that everything is conditioned by others, but it also recognizes that nothing has its own being.

  There is another philosophical element that makes his relativism more intensified.  With this intensification, his relativism would even look as if it were very similar to the radical relativism that we have discussed above.  As we have seen, if a relativism is to be called “radical” with respect to the philosophy of religion, there should be something more than the emphasis on the relativity of mundane things.  It must relativize the transcendent too.

 Above all, in Whitehead’s philosophy, God is relativized in terms of God’s relationship with the world.  In traditional Christian theology, God, who is all-powerful and non-contingent, is said to unilaterally control the world, which is contingent.  Whitehead criticized the traditional theism for introducing “an entirely static God, with eminent reality in relation to an entirely fluent world with deficient reality.”[9] In Whitehead’s philosophy, therefore, God’s creative activity is to be shared with the world.  The interaction of God and the world is, in his technical expressions, described in the following manner.  

In his primordial nature, God is depicted as a lure for actual occasions of the world.  The lure of God functions to offer the possibilities that can serve as an ideal aim for the occasions, which are in the process of becoming.  The possibilities offered by God are called “ideal” because they are all the best options for the occasions to choose.  However, according to Whitehead, God’s ideal aim can be influential only in the initial phase of the process of becoming.  In other words, although the process of becoming in an occasion is partly dominated by God, it is not God that dominates the whole process of becoming altogether.  Therefore, it can be said that all the occasions of the world are free from God’s control.  This means that the creative power belonging only to God in traditional theism is now ascribed to the world too.  For this reason, we can recognize that Whitehead allows real contingency into God’s nature.  Whitehead calls such nature in God “consequent nature.”  The consequent nature of God is constituted by God’s reception of the realized actualities of the world.  In this sense, God is contingent upon the world, just as the world is contingent upon God.  

So far, we have seen how God, as a transcendent ultimate, is relativized in Whitehead’s philosophy.  An interesting thing to note here is that what we have seen with respect to the nature of God is totally different from that of the transcendent ultimate that has appeared in the history of Western philosophy.  In Whitehead’s relativistic philosophy, God is no longer the only One that is ultimate.  This fact is described in the framework of Whitehead’s metaphysics in the following manner:  “ ‘[C]reativity,’ ‘many,’ ‘one’ are the ultimate notions. . . . These three notions complete the Category of the Ultimate and are presupposed in all the more special categories.”[10]  In another place, Whitehead even claims that, in his philosophy, the ultimate is termed creativity and “God is its primordial, non-temporal accident.”[11]

As we can guess, the reason why the notions of “creativity,” “many” and “one” are involved here, with respect to the Category of the Ultimate, is that those notions are employed as metaphysical tools for explicating not only how this universe is constituted by interrelationship among things, but also how God shares the ultimacy with other ultimates.  In this way, Whitehead produces a strong model of relativism.  Some may understand why I say that his relativism looks similar to the radical relativism that we have seen before, since it too emphasizes that all things in this universe, including even God, are so relative that they are contingent and conditional.  Now that we have seen how Whitehead internalizes a relativism into his philosophical system, lets us see how Whitehead’s philosophy can provide us with an ideal model of relativism that solves the problems of radical relativism.  This has already been suggested when we mentioned two notions, i.e., the notion of subjective immediacy and the primordial nature of God.

As we can recall, in order to solve the problems of radical relativism with regard to the issue of religious pluralism, a philosophy of religion should provide three things at least.  Those three conditions to be met are: First, it should provide a philosophical method that emphasizes the existence of subjectivity.  This is needed because the radical relativist’s idea that everything is conditioned, as we saw, tends to lead to weakening the uniqueness of one’s own perspective.  Second, it should provide the philosophy of religion whereby the existence of transcendence can be so affirmed that both the denial of the reality of the transcendent, and the denial of the differentiation between the ultimate and non-ultimate can be avoided.  Third, it should explain how the different doctrines of the ultimate arising from the conflicting truth-claims between Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic religions are to be harmonized.  Let us see how these three conditions are to be met in Whitehead’s philosophy.

First, how does Whitehead’s philosophy provide the relativism in which the existence of subjectivity can be emphasized?  

One of the most innovative ideas derived from Whitehead’s concept of process is that both the standpoint of relationality and the standpoint of creative advance go together at the same time.  In other words, the emphasis on the relational worldview based on the analysis of process is always complemented by the emphasis on the concept of creative advance. Therefore, in Whitehead’s notion of relativism, to be a thing is to be relative by means of two features: conditional feature and creative feature.  On the one hand, based on conditional feature, a thing is related to other things as being internally influenced by them.  Here, the relativism recognizes that everything is conditioned by others.  Based on creative feature, on the other hand, the thing is not only the unification of other things, but also the modification of them from the perspective of the thing itself.  Here, the relativism emphasizes the fact that a thing also conditions other things.  In Whitehead’s words, this is expressed as “the many become one, and are increased by one.”[12]  

By virtue of this creative feature, Whitehead’s relativism is able to affirm that although an occasion in the process of becoming is produced by the unification of antecedent occasions, it completes the process by entailing “subjective immediacy,” which functions as a condition for subsequent occasions.  Of course, what we have here with regard to the notion of “subjectivity” differs from the subjectivity posited by the traditional model of Western philosophy.  However, the real issue here is not so much whether we have the subjectivity that has its own “substantial identity,” but rather whether we have the subjectivity that can function as a condition to others.  If this is the case, then it is true to say that Whitehead’s relativism is successful in affirming such subjectivity.           

Now, we are in a position to see how Whitehead’s relativism can be an alternative to the radical relativism, which has caused some problems to interreligious dialogue in East Asia.  As we have seen, one of the most significant problems associated with radical relativism is that, since the relativism tends to diminish one’s own subjectivity, it is very difficult for it to have any philosophical tools with which it can affirm the positive value of one’s own religion.  And it has also been said that this tendency easily leads to undermining the religious passion of sincere believers.

If we apply Whiteheadian relativism to interreligous dialogue, we can recognize the uniqueness of one’s own religion, while we still acknowledge the conditionedness of all the religions.  Instead of debilitating one’s own religious conviction, we can encourage people to be proud of the particular value of one’s own religion, while acknowledging the particular value of other religions too.[13]

The second condition to be met for establishing an ideal kind of relativism is how to talk about the philosophy of religion where the existence of transcendence can be so affirmed that both the denial of the reality of the transcendent and the denial of diffrentiation between the ultimate and non-ultimate are avoided.  This condition is to be met easily when we return to the doctrine of the primordial nature of God.       

  Owing to the primordial nature of God, it can be said that Whitehead never gives up the notion of transcendence in the radical sense.  This is because the primordial nature of God is said to transcend the world absolutely in some senses.  In one sense, the primordial nature of God transcends the world in that the world would never be able to do what the primordial nature of God does uniquely.  According to Whitehead, the primordial nature of God consists in God’s entertainment of pure possibilities, which are ready for the sake of occasions to be actualized in the world.  The possibilities are so eternal and ideal that it is logically impossible for worldly beings to possess them by themselves.  This is why the nature of God is called “primordial.”  God thus transcends the world absolutely.

  In another sense, God’s primordial nature transcends the world absolutely because it intransigently occupies its own position in the process of an occasions’ becoming.  As we said before, the possibilities offered by God’s primordial nature are called “ideal,” because they are all the best options for the occasion to choose.  This means that it is necessary for an occasion to consider the ideal option given by God, though this option is influential only in the initial phase of the process of the occasion’s becoming.  In other words, although the process of becoming in an occasion is not totally determined by God, it is only God that dominates the first phase of the process.  In this sense, God’s position and status in the process of the becoming of the world are steady and firm.  Therefore, although it is true to say that all the occasions of the world are free from God’s control in a sense, it is also fair to say that God’s role as the transcendent is unshakable too.  In this sense, God transcends the world absolutely.

  This interpretation of God’s transcendence can lead to an alternative to the radical relativism in which non-realist interpretations of the transcendent are entailed.  In a word, the primordial nature of God shows how God can function as transcendence in a strict sense.  That is to say, as Whitehead once said, “it is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God.”[14] Strangely enough, even David Hall and Roger Ames have once recognized that Whitehead‘s concept of God can talk about transcendence in a strict sense.  When they deal with Whitehead’s concept of transcendence, they claim as follows: “The world as this actual world transcends God in a rather Pickwickian sense since it needs God for its actualization, while God needs only some actual world, not necessarily this one.”[15]  In Whitehead’s relativism, as they acknowledge, God thus transcends the world in a strict sense.

If this is the case, then is it not obvious that Whitehead’s doctrine of God, based on such a realist interpretation of transcendence, makes some trouble with the East Asian religions in which a non-realist interpretation is so pervasive?  

  This is why I said that the third condition must be met, if we want to provide an ideal type of relativism.  And, I am confident that Whitehead’s doctrine of the ultimate does meet the third condition too.  The third condition is to be met when we reconsider Whitehead’s theory of the ultimate.  As we saw above, we discover another ultimate in addition to God in Whitehead’s metaphysics.  Of course, there have been many different interpretations with regard to the issue of what Whitehead’s concept of the ultimate really is.  However, recently, many Whiteheadian philosophers of religion, such as John Cobb and David Griffin, have been in agreement to recognize that the correct interpretation of Whitehead’s position with regard to the issue of the ultimate is that there are two ultimates, i.e., creativity and God.[16]  I agree with this interpretation too.  Therefore, I believe that if we employ this interpretation of the ultimate, it is easy for us to meet the third condition we are dealing with now.

As we have seen, with regard to the issue of the ultimate, Abrahamic religions and East Asian religions have been in serious conflict.  From the perspective of East Asian religions, Abrahamic religions’ concept of the ultimate, arising from a realist interpretation of transcendence, seems off base.  Furthermore, in East Asian religions, the personal God arising from Abrahamic religions has also been taken to be inferior to the impersonal Deity rooted in Asian religions, since it is believed that the personal God is derivative from the impersonal Deity.  In this way, conflicting truth-claims are serious because of the many different notions of the ultimate in East Asia.  How is this solved by Whitehead’s notion of two ultimates?

The central argument associated with the Whiteheadian idea of two ultimates is, according to David Griffin, that the relationship between the two ultimates, i.e., creativity and God, is not subordination.  This is because in Whitehead’s metaphysics, creativity and God mutually presuppose each other.  As we saw above, on the one hand, God is said to be an accident of creativity, implying that God is an “instantiation” of the ultimate reality.[17]  In this sense, creativity as an ultimate is presupposed by God.   However, on the other hand, it is also affirmed that God is “the aboriginal instance of this creativity.”[18] According to David Griffin, this can be interpreted as saying that creativity itself cannot be characterized without God.  Therefore, as Griffin insists, “creativity has never existed neutrally, without being shaped by God’s primordial aim toward value-realization.”[19] In this sense, God is also presupposed by creativity, entailing that both are equally ultimate.

Once we accept this Whiteheadian interpretation of two ultimates, we are able to see how this idea can serve to solve the problem of the conflicting truth-claims in East Asia.  If God as an ultimate is to be construed as actual, creativity as an ultimate is to be construed as non-actual.  Furthermore, while the former can be said to be personal, the latter can be said to be impersonal, which may mean that while the former is the product of the main stream in the history of Abrahamic religious experience, the latter is the product of the main stream in that of East Asian religious experience.  In this way, the problem of the conflicting truth-claims is to be resolved, because it is said that they are all equally ultimate.  

If this is the case, we are once again in a position to understand how this solution overcomes the weakness of radical relativism too.  One of the most significant problems of radical relativism is that it is not to be construed as a genuine type of relativism in the sense that it favors only one notion of the ultimate.  In other words, since the position of radical relativism is based on the principle of universal relativity, it tends to deny the differentiation between the transcendent and non-transcendent, and the ultimate and the non-ultimate.  Hence, the Abrahamic religions, which focused on the differentiation between them, are regarded as inferior to East Asian religions.  By contrast, if we apply the Whiteheadian type of moderate relativism to the theory of religious pluralism, it is possible to say that both kinds of religious experience can be regarded as equally valid.  And, it goes without saying that this type of religious pluralism can be construed as more genuine in the sense that it recognizes the plurality of religions in a complete manner.

Concluding Remark

I am a Christian theologian. However, I am one who sees deep problems in traditional Christian theology, insofar as it is not free from the shackles of absolutistic conceptions of truth. Therefore, I believe that as far as interreligious dialogue is concerned in East Asia, it is Christianity that first has to incorporate the relativistic understanding of truth.  With this understanding, Christianity must admit the fact that all religions, including Christianity, are relative and limited.  This is what Christianity can learn from the truth of relativism.

Nevertheless, while I have been involved in the interreligious dialogue between Christianity and East Asian religions, I began to realize that East Asian religions themselves are also a stumbling block that hinders the development of interreligious dialogue in East Asia.  I believe that one of the most significant reasons why East Asians are not successful in their dialogue with Abrahamic religions is based on their philosophy of relativism, which has turned out, in this essay, to be too radical to harmonize with the theistic religions.  Therefore, although I agree with the fact that most of East Asian religions have a depth of insight into the principle of relativism, it seems that their notion of radical relativism should be transformed in some respects.

This is why I have introduced a Whiteheadian philosophy of relativism.  I am sure that if we apply the Whiteheadian relativism to the philosophy of East Asian religions, we can get an ideal methodology for establishing a better type of religious pluralism.  The new perception of religious pluralism based on this Whiteheadian relativism will be able to push our consciousness toward the insight that all religions are equally valid.  I believe that with this perception, we will be able to make some contribution to resolving the conflict between Abrahamic religions and East Asian religions.