McHenry, Leemon B.  "Descriptive and Revisionary Theories of Events."  Process Studies 25 (1996): 90-103.

Abstract

Much of the current debate on the ontological status of events is conducted within the framework of what Strawson called "descriptive metaphysics."  Whether or not events gain the privileged status of 'particulars' along with primary substances depends essentially on an analysis of the logic of their grammar.  Following the lead of Russell, Whitehead and Quine, this paper challenges the Aristotelian bias of the descriptive approach and argues for a revisionary event ontology.  The conceptual scheme of ordinary language is thereby replaced with one that is more compatible with modern physics.  Events, in this theory, replace Aristotelian substances as the primary constituents of the universe -- they are conceived as units of space-time spreading throughout and overlapping within the electromagnetic field.  [Abstract from The Philosopher's Index]