Ford, Lewis S.  “On Genetic Successiveness: A Third Alternative.”  The Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969-70): 421-425.

Abstract

John Cobb ("Freedom in Whitehead's Philosophy", S J Phil 7, 409-413) demonstrates how the theory of epochal becoming reconciles freedom with causality, but Edward Pols ("Freedom and Agency", Ibid., 415-419) shows how Cobb's argument conflicts with Whitehead's remarks on genetic succession;  we seek to resolve this conflict.  Genetic succession cannot be statically understood in terms of simple feelings and their complex integrations, but is a series of sub-decisions severally reducing the occasion's indeterminacy to determinateness, sub-decisions which jointly constitute its self-decision.  Incomplete phases are multiplicities of determinate items, indeterminate in their concrete unity which is still being decided.  This process from indeterminacy to determinateness necessarily differs from physical time which is the succession of determinately unified entities.  [Abstract from The Philosopher’s Index]