Felt, James W.  "Intuition, Event-Atomism, and the Self."  In Bergson and Modern Thought, ed. Andrew C. Papanicolaou (New York: Harwood), 38-50.

Abstract

Bergson's distinction between intuition and intelligence may reconcile his analysis of temporal personal identity with that of Whitehead.  Bergson's affirmation of the unity of "duree" seems in conflict with Whitehead's description of a historic route of ontically distinct event-atoms ('actual occasions'), but as the product of two different functions of the mind the results can be seen as complementary rather than antithetical.  This suggests both the feasibility of some kind of metaphysics of enduring beings, and an intrinsic but overlooked limitation of any speculative philosophy that relies too heavily on purely conceptual thinking.  [Abstract from The Philosopher's Index]