Bjelland, Andrew G. “Durational Succession and Proto-Mental Agency.” n.d. [Unpublished Paper].

Abstract

The Bergsonian systematic progressively displays the consequences, for philosophy and science, which flow from a single, central thesis: Durational succession—whether psychological or physical—is a dynamic, asymmetrical, and internal relation. This thesis constitutes the very heart of the Bergsonian systematic and lends that systematic its distinctive, revolutionary character. This paper: (1) analyzes Bergson’s theory of durational succession; (2) displays the continuity of that theory with Bergson’s proto-mentalist metaphysics; (3) contrasts Bergson’s theory with the theories of temporal succession which dominated thought during the classical modern period of Western philosophical and scientific development; and (4) links Bergson’s theory of durational succession with his theory of causality and proto-mental agency—a theory of causation which endorses the objective indetermination of the future.