Bertocci, Peter A.  "Toward a Metaphysics of Creation."  The Review of Metaphysics 17, no. 4 (June 1964): 493-510.

Abstract

In this paper I am assuming that a good case can be made for the existence of God. I shall defend the thesis that creative change characterizes the nature of God. I shall suggest that such a view of God can be supported by a temporalistic view of such personal being as we find in ourselves, and I shall finally argue that a temporalistic form of personalistic theism (not pantheism, not panentheism) can reasonably illuminate what we actually do find in human experience and the world. On such matters, of course, we can expect, as Plato reminded us, no more that probability—the probability that Bishop Butler saw as the guide of life.

However, in proposing such theses I am aware that the challenge is to great traditions in metaphysical and religious thought. Accordingly, I begin with a brief statement of what I take to be the strongest and basic motifs for the contention that ultimate Being must be perfect in the absolutistic sense that nothing could conceivably be added or subtracted from its existence.