A Process Alternative to Pax Americana
by John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin
Does
process philosophy have anything distinctive to say about the present course
of U.S. foreign policies? We think it does, and when such fateful decisions
are being made about the de
Our
Estimation of the Plans for a Pax Americana
The
policies of our administration are laid out in "The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America,” made public (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html)
in September 2002. They call for the development of such overwhelming
military power by the United States that other countries will realize the
futility of developing competing military forces. The USA will therefore be
able to maintain hegemony over the whole world for the indefinite future.
This hegemony will require preemptive action against any who threaten to
develop countervailing forces. It will also require that the United States
not subordinate itself to international agreements or institutions that
might inhibit independent initiatives required to create and maintain its
complete hegemony.
In this document, these policies are
generally presented as responses to the threat of terrorism, but this
presentation is designed more to gain public support than to explain the
real rationale for the central policies. No doubt many motives lie behind
them. But it is illuminating that since the closing years of the first Bush
administration, key figures of this administration have been committed to
the goal of establishing a Pax Americana. These figures have been closely
related to The Project for the New American Century, established in 1997,
the position of which is most fully developed in "Rebuilding America's
Defenses: Strategy: Forces and Resources For a New Century," published
in September 2000 (www.newamericancentury.org). This project is especially
directed at the Arab and Islamic countries in the Middle East, although it
is concerned about North Korea and China as well. The neoconservatives who
have developed this vision have argued that American imperialism is benign
and that a worldwide Pax Americana will be a world of peace and prosperity
based on democratic principles.
The formulations in the National
Security Strategy are aimed at making the American people less reluctant to
assume a new kind of imperial role (see Richard Haass, The
Reluctant Sheriff). This kind of civilizing ideology has informed many
empires. It informed, for example, the disastrous French attempts to
regain control of Indochina after World War II and to retain control of
Algeria. The idea that America had a “manifest destiny” to take over
this entire continent and then bring its Christian, democratic,
free-enterprise form of life to the rest of the world has long animated the
elite class in this country, whose economic interests coincide with the
policies this ideology promotes (see Richard W. Van Alstyne, The
Rising American Empire; Anders Stephanson, Manifest
Destiny).
There are many reasons in process
thought to believe that the attempt to enforce a Pax Americana on the world
will not have the idyllic consequences portrayed by its advocates. First,
the fundamental reality of the universe, which is embodied in all creatures
and to the highest degree in human beings, is creativity. We are
fundamentally creative beings. It is this fact that lies behind the strong
human desire for freedom, to be self-determining persons.
A second central point of process
thought is that we are fundamentally social, communal beings. We are largely
constituted by our relations to our community and its traditions. This
point, combined with the previous one, lies behind the strong drive by
communities to be self-determining so that they can, if they wish, maintain
their own traditions.
For these two reasons alone, the
American attempt to enforce an alien way of life on Muslim and Arab (as well
as other) peoples will create enormous resentment and resistance, even if
the attempt is sincerely aimed at improving their lives.
There are, furthermore, additional
reasons in process thought for skepticism about the success of an attempted
Pax Americana. One of these is the ignorance that characterizes every finite
point of view. We may be so convinced that we know what is good for other
people that we think we should force it upon them for their own good, even
if they don’t want it. But human beings are very complex creatures, and
the values that make life intrinsically valuable can vary greatly. Apart
from being privy to the divine point of view, we need to avoid the arrogance
of claiming to know better than other people themselves what would improve
their lives. We should, of course, offer what we genuinely believe will be
of help. But it must be an offer that can be refused.
Another factor that should induce
humility is the bias that inevitably infects every finite perspective. We
have learned much in the past century about the way in which ideological
bias inevitably distorts utopian visions, compounding the distortion that
comes from mere ignorance. In Whitehead’s thought, the blindness created
by this bias is grounded in his basic categories: Every moment of our
experience is guided by a “subjective aim,” and this aim largely
determines the way--the “subjective form” with which--we evaluate the
data. Our aim even influences whether or not certain factors rise to the
level of conscious awareness. For example, if our fundamental aims involve
matters such as guaranteeing the flourishing of the US economy by enlarging
the number of its trading partners and ensuring its supply of inexpensive
oil for the foreseeable future, we will likely decide that what is good for
America (in this sense) is good for the rest of the world. Others are
unlikely to see matters in the same way.
A fifth reason why we believe that the
attempt to create a Pax Americana will fail is that, according to process
thought, moral experience is universal. We know injustice when we see it and
especially when we feel it. Continued injustice produces outrage. The many
injustices that will result from our efforts to "pacify" the world
will produce increased resistance, some of which will take the form of
terrorism.
A
sixth factor that makes process thinkers skeptical about the wisdom of
aiming at a Pax Americana is our appreciation of the power of habit.
Although we as individuals have freedom in each moment to transcend the
past, we all know from experience that habits, especially very long-standing
habits, are hard to break. This persistence of habitual ways of perceiving
and acting is even stronger in institutions, which, as Reinhold Niebuhr
stressed in Moral Man and Immoral
Society, have far less capacity for self-transcendence than do
individual human beings. This means that the United States is likely to
exercise its power in the future much as it has exercised it in the past.
Does the history of US foreign policy over the past century give reason to
believe that the present US effort to bring about regime change in various
countries around the world will really result in improving the lives of the
peoples of those countries?
The answer is, sad to say, No. As some
of our best historians have shown, when there has been a choice between
helping US business interests in other countries and fulfilling the US
commitment to foster democracy and self-determination, Washington has
regularly chosen the former. What this has meant concretely is that
Washington has often supported right-wing dictators who have oppressed their
own peoples for the benefit of the wealthy both in their own country and in
the United States. This has been true of even our most idealistic
presidents, such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. It was FDR, for
example, who said--in response to why he supported an especially murderous
dictator: “He’s an S.O.B., but he’s our
S.O.B.” (see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable
Revolutions; David F. Schmitz, Thank
God They’re On Our Side).
With regard to the prospect that a Pax
Americana would mean a world of peace and prosperity based on democratic
principles, we should examine the conditions of some of those countries over
which the USA has long exercised the most control--for example, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
They have never had genuine democracy--indeed, whenever a more democratic
form of rule seemed a real possibility, the United States has undercut this
possibility in favor of reestablishing military rule in service to the
traditional elite and the military rulers themselves (see LaFeber, Inevitably
Revolutions; Noam Chomsky, Deterring
Democracy; William Blum, Killing
Hope).
The National Security Strategy presents
the global hegemony of the United States as furthering the globalization and
liberalization of the economy. The assumption, based on neo-liberal economic
theory, is that this will increase human prosperity globally, eventually
overcoming poverty everywhere. In fact, however, these policies have greatly
increased the gap between rich nations and poor nations, a gap largely
initiated by European colonialism, and also the gap between the rich and the
poor within most countries. Assuming that a Pax Americana will indeed
intensify present trends in these directions, the misery of the poor will
increase.
Process thought does not teach that
radical change is impossible. Despite
the negative consequences of past forms of American hegemony, it is possible
that future forms will be benign. Unfortunately, nothing in the current
rhetoric favoring a Pax Americana suggests that repentance can be expected.
On the contrary, it celebrates the virtuousness that we have displayed as a
nation.
Our
conquest of Iraq provides a test case for our global policies.
It has been justified on a number of grounds. One type of
justification expressed concern for Iraqis and other people in the region.
Saddam Hussein was said to be a menace to his neighbors because he had
attacked Iran and invaded Kuwait. But it was seldom mentioned that
Washington encouraged him to attack Iran and gave him a green light to
invade Kuwait. Another justification for regime change was that Saddam was a
brutal dictator who oppressed his own people and who, during that war with
Iran, gassed both Kurds and Iranians. But it is seldom mentioned that,
knowing all these facts at the time, Washington continued to support him as
long as he served US interests (see Dilip Hiro, Iraq).
Closely related was the claim that regime change was necessary to bring
democracy to Iraq. But it is very unlikely that Washington will allow
majority government in Iraq. The country is 60% Shiite, and the last thing
Washington wants is another Shiite regime in the region. Despite all the
talk about “turning Iraq over to the Iraqis,” all real power will remain
in Washington--as advocates of the war have pointed out (Lawrence Kaplan and
William Kristol, The War over Iraq).
A
second justification for the attack has been that there was a connection
between Iraq and al-Qaeda, However, no credible evidence for such a
connection has been offered. In fact the administration had set its sights
on Iraq long before 9/11 and only used the ensuing “war on terrorism” as
a pretext (see Richard Falk, The Great
War on Terrorism).
A third justification has been that Iraq built weapons of mass destruction
in violation of its agreement with the United Nations and did not cooperate
with weapons inspectors sent to force it to obey resolutions of the UN
Security Council. In fact, however, the evidence is that the weapons
inspectors had largely ended Iraq's programs in this field some time ago. In
any case, Iraq was certainly not the nation that most consistently
disregarded Security Council resolutions or developed the largest arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction. Israel, besides having developed nuclear
weapons while systematically deceiving Washington (see Avner Cohen, Israel
and the Bomb), has violated far more Security Council resolutions than
Iraq.
Given
the weakness of the justifications offered for the conquest of Iraq, we are
forced to look elsewhere for the real reasons. The actual motives for the
war on Iraq seemed to have been nationalistic and imperialistic: to ensure
control of more of the world’s supply of oil, to provide a
“demonstration effect” for other countries not yet ready to accept
Washington's hegemony, and to prepare the US military and the American
public for further “wars of liberation” in countries that refuse to take
heed. In short, the deeper purpose of conquering Iraq seems to be the
advance of the global hegemony of the United States for the sake of
establishing a Pax Americana.
Commitment to the goal of a Pax Americana expresses itself in increasing the military budget. The goal is to have such overwhelming military power that no nation or group of nations can challenge it. To make ourselves invulnerable to such challenges, the administration is committed to military control and use of space. (See Karl Grossman Weapons in Space) Two corollaries are that social expenditures will be reduced and civil liberties curtailed.
Can
Process Thought Inspire A More Hopeful Path?
If
this is what our process perspective leads us to expect from the
continuation of the present trajectory, the next question is whether process
thought can suggest a more hopeful direction. We believe it can.
We begin with the agreement that
democracy, based on a recognition of basic human rights and a separation of
powers, is the best form of government, in part because it has proven to be
the only form capable of protecting its citizens’ basic rights. Saddam’s
regime illustrated the fact that the concentration of power tends to lead to
massive violations of human rights. As Reinhold Niebuhr, who was
significantly influenced by process thought,
said (in the language of his time): “Man’s capacity for justice
makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes
democracy necessary” (The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, xiii.) Lord
Acton made a similar point in famously saying that “power tends to
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” We agree, therefore,
with the neoconservatives’ emphasis on the value of democracy.
The neoconservatives believe that a
world controlled by Washington will be favorable to democracy. We
acknowledge that Washington may succeed in imposing formal democratic
structure in some parts of the world where they do not now exist. The
results of US conquest may leave Afghanistan and Iraq with such
institutions. However, as we have already indicated in the case of Iraq,
there is no reason to believe that the United States will allow for majority
rule where the will of the majority is in conflict with American interests.
We support the neoconservatives' goal of
constitutional democratic governments throughout the world, but for us
democracy entails the freedom of people to rule themselves. They should be
free from the domination of another nation. A Pax Americana would not
promote that goal. We expect that in a world ruled by Washington, the
corruption there and the injustice everywhere will be greater than at
present.
A related reason for our differing
visions is theological. Aiming for total American hegemony is based in some
cases on an atheistic worldview, according to which there are no moral
values in the nature of things, so that “might makes right.” Sometimes,
on the contrary, it is justified by a dualistic religious vision of the
world in terms of the virtuous, whom we identify with ourselves, and the
vicious, whom we identify with our opponents. This dualistic vision is often
part and parcel of a worldview based on traditional theism, which presents
an image of divine sovereignty to which all must submit. Whitehead was
severely critical of this view, which, he said, involves “a barbaric
conception of God” (Religion in the
Making, 55). By a “barbarian,” in this context, Whitehead meant one
who “speaks in terms of power. He dreams of the superman with the mailed
fist. . . . [H]is final good is conceived as one will imposing itself upon
other wills” (Adventures of Ideas,
51). Traditional Western theology, in other words, has portrayed the divine
reality as a cosmic barbarian. This theology, Whitehead added, involved
“idolatry,” because it fashioned God “in the image of the Egyptian,
Persian, and Roman imperial rulers” (Process
and Reality. 342). Western thought thereby created an imperialistic
cosmology.
Given humanity’s basic religious
impulse, which is to imitate the divine reality as we understand it, this
imperialistic cosmology has had disastrous consequences. Saying that “the
worship of glory arising from power is . . . dangerous,” Whitehead added:
“I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the bones of those
slaughtered because of men intoxicated by its attraction” (Religion
in the Making, 55). Elaborating on this idea, he said that the doctrine
of a “transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and
whose imposed will it obeys, is the fallacy which has infused tragedy into
the histories of Christianity and [Islam]” (Process
and Reality, 342). This doctrine has infused so much tragedy because it
has led its devotees to imitate their imagined creator by imposing their
wills on other peoples. It seems that some of our rulers in Washington have
this idea of God. These rulers evidently see themselves as benevolent, but
they have regarded the decision about how to exercise their benevolence as
theirs alone, and they have become furious when others do not obey.
In process theism, by contrast, all
creatures, having their own creative power, are partly self-determining.
Divine power is, therefore, persuasive rather than coercive. God's power is
exercised, with the intent not to compel but to empower. With this image of
divine power, our desire to imitate deity implies a very different ideal of
leadership. We will, for example, seek to find ways in which all members of
a community can participate in shaping the rules that govern their lives.
Given
these principles plus the phenomenon of globalization, we are led to
advocate global democracy. By this we mean both the development of
instruments of democratic governance at the global level and the spread and
intensification of democratic practices at all levels of society. In
justifying this vision, we are guided by three central ideas. One conviction
is that economic institutions should be regulated by political ones that can
express the will of the people. Second is the process vision of the world as
composed of societies of societies of societies. At the human level, we
think of the world as a community of communities of communities. The third
guiding idea is the Catholic principle of subsidiarity, which stipulates
that decisions should be made as close to the local level as possible. In
the United States, for example, the federal government should not be
empowered to make decisions that can be effectively made and enforced at the
municipal or state level. There are, nevertheless, certain issues that must
be regulated at the national level.
Likewise, there are today some issues
that can only be effectively regulated at the global level. We have reached
the stage where some types of pollution must be regulated at the global
level. At present, however, this most inclusive human community has no means
by which it can exercise self-determination. The neo-conservatives seem to
believe that the United States will deal wisely with these matters, but the
evidence contradicts this optimistic view. The United States is the
world’s greatest polluter. It has rejected even the wholly inadequate
standards proposed by the Kyoto Treaty. And the environmental policies of
the present administration are blatantly subordinated to economic interests.
Process thought calls for empowering
individuals, communities, and communities of communities up to, and today
especially, the global community of communities. This much is clear. But
moving from these principles to stating more exactly what this means for
reforming the present global system is more difficult. We will begin with
points of ready agreement around which we are now ready to organize or
support existing organizations. We will then note areas of greater
uncertainty.
At
the global level we should work against the domination of affairs by the
United States and for the strengthening of existing international
institutions. This means shifting power from the Bretton Woods Institutions,
easily dominated by the United States, to the United Nations, where a
greater variety of perspectives are brought to bear.
Within the United Nations it requires shifting power from the
Security Council to the General Assembly. It means also giving the United
Nations a permanent army to help carry out its responsibilities. And it
means strengthening the authority of the World Court and the new
International Criminal Court.
Within the United States, it means
abandoning militarization of space and shifting budget priorities from
military to social purposes. It
means signing international treaties we participated in formulating.
It means ceasing to pressure other nations to privatize their
economic assets, thereby making them available for purchase by transnational
corporations. More broadly it means allowing people in other countries
control over their own economic future. Practically and urgently it means
opposing the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. Overall, it means
allowing world opinion to give some direction to our international policies
instead of trying to manipulate that opinion in favor or our interests.
We need, however, to go beyond such
desiderata to propose visions of a world order that would more nearly embody
our ideals. One such vision emphasizes the multiple levels at which
authority should be exercised, and it applies to them the principles of
subsidiarity and the vision of communities of communities. This calls for
the devolution of power by sovereign nation states to their parts. Instead
of the nation state being sovereign, the ultimate power belongs to people,
who should determine their local affairs as far as possible. This would not
be very far unless the economy is also decentralized, since people who are
economically powerless cannot govern themselves politically. Since there are
many issues that must be decided at larger levels, what we call states in
this country and the national government must have the authority to deal
with many matters. Nations in turn should grant authority to regional
bodies, such as the European Union, to make the decisions that can only be
made at that level. Finally regional bodies, in turn, should give authority
to the global government to take action where only global action suffices.
A second vision focuses more directly on
the creation of a democratic government for the whole planet. It shares with
the neo-conservatives the view that the world as a whole requires
centralized control. It differs sharply with respect to who should exercise
that control. It calls for the people of the world to develop a global
constitution that would transform the present international institutions
into a global government or else replace them with better ones. It would
have the power to enforce its decisions everywhere. This would not mean that
governments at lower levels would be disempowered. It would entail a federal
system, and decentralization of power of existing nation states according
the principle of subsidiarity can also be encouraged.
Hence, in comparison with their shared opposition to the Pax
Americana, the differences between these two visions are not great.
Nevertheless, there are differences, and
they are important. The strengths and weaknesses of the two proposals
differ. The first would distribute power, including police and military
power, at several levels. This means that a world government would not bring
an end to the danger of military conflicts between nations or regions. The
second would concentrate military power in the hands of a world government,
which could prevent organized warfare among nations. The challenge would be
to find ways to ensure that the use of this power not support the tyranny of
the majority against the minority or take over power altogether from
civilian rulers.
Neither system can ensure that the
structures of democracy not be controlled by moneyed interests. The hope for
the former is that greater involvement of people in electing persons they
personally know can reduce the influence of money and the corruption
associated therewith. The hope for the latter is that the global
constitution can be so written as to prevent wealth from buying elections
and significantly influencing elected officials.
Given the agreement that we must have
political control over economic interests, a centralized global government
has immediate advantages. Our economy is in fact global. For this reason, it
cannot be controlled by nations or even by regional bodies. Unless the
economy is radically changed, only a strong centralized, global government
can regulate it for the common good. On the other hand, even a regulated
global economy will continue to damage local communities. It renders the
principle of subsidiarity largely meaningless. Hence, the goal of economic
decentralization, central to the first proposal, seems urgent and may best
be implemented in tandem with political decentralization.
From the point of view of process
thought, individual thinkers, even those influenced by process thought,
should not try to develop an ideal system and pressure others to adopt it.
The value of proposals such as these is, first, to show that a Pax Americana
is not the only possible future for the planet. Second, such proposals can
stimulate discussion, involving many in thinking of the advantages and
disadvantages of such systems and also proposing their own alternatives.
If
there is no widespread discussion of the kind of world we want, either the
neo-conservatives will triumph, or the effort to achieve a Pax Americana
will bring about chaos. To us, both of these possibilities are disastrous.
We are sure that something better is possible. But it will not happen
without vigorous debate and hard work in reforming global and local
institutions. We believe that process thought can contribute to this task.